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Abstract 
 
The process of globalisation has been a widely discussed topic over the past 
two decades, and a great enabler and driving force behind this process has 
been the airline industry. In addition, deregulation is said to have a great 
impact on company performance and profitability, and is often associated 
with being a direct consequence of globalisation.  
 
This paper examines the US and the EU airline industry with the intent to test 
the consequences of deregulation. We document that the two regions 
deregulated their respective markets differently in time; the US deregulated in 
1979 and the EU gradually from 1985 to 1997. We test the two markets 
concerning profit margin, before and after the final EU deregulation in 1997. 
The evidence indicates that US airlines have a higher profit margin than their 
European counterparts, both before and after the EU deregulation. In addition, 
we find no indication that the EU airlines improved in profitability after the 
final deregulation. Finally, we find that different variables affect profit margin 
differently in the two markets. 
 
 
 
Key Words: Market Regulation, Profitability, Economies of Scale and Scope, 
Capital Structure 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
A widely discussed topic in late economics is “globalisation”. Globalisation is 
often attacked or praised as a thing, when it is in fact a process. It’s a process 
of accelerating integration and combined national economies, through 
growing streams of trade, investments, and capital across historic borders. 
These streams, in a broader sense, include organizational skills, technology, 
ideas, information, entertainment, and popular culture. More recently, 
globalisation also includes financial trade and monetary policies through 
economic unions. According to Yergin, Vietor and Evans (2000) the aviation 
industry is one of the great enablers of globalisation; but, as an industry, it is a 
laggard in adapting to globalisation due to the peculiarities of its organization 
and its half-century of national and international regulation. 
 
A more open world with lower barriers across borders can lead to major 
opportunities but also significant challenges for companies. Whether they stay 
alive and grow depends not only on the opportunities but also on how they 
react to the challenges in a world of intensified competition. National borders 
nowadays provide much less protection than they previously did. The 
intensified pressure steaming from globalisation is also a reaction from global 
shareholders, while technology and the Internet are adding to the pressure. 
 
Further, Yergin et al (2000) stress that a natural development for companies 
following the globalisation process, inescapably, is a drive for scope and 
scale. Scope and scale often permit companies to serve customers more 
broadly and better, it enables companies to bring down costs and to spread 
them over a wider base, for the purpose of being as competitive as possible in 
as many parts of the world as is feasible. Scale also provides evolution of 
firms internal knowledge and management systems. Further, scale economies 
enable companies to spread their brand over a larger geographical area. Scale, 
by definition, means bigger companies, and that means consolidation in the 
aftermath of falling barriers to trade and investment. These forces help to 
explain the sharp rise in domestic and cross-border mergers over the last 
decade. 
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This paper investigates the US and the European airline industry and the 
effects of deregulation. The globalisation has driven competition to another 
level, and efficiency is a key factor for survival. As deregulation started in the 
US in the late seventies, the market has become very liberal concerning the 
competitive environment. The US airline companies have over a longer time 
than their European counterparts, been forced to adapt to this fiercer market 
condition. In Europe, national regulations and political interests have limited 
both competition and consolidation between airline companies. In contrast to 
the US, Europe has lagged regarding these regulatory settings. The drive 
towards globalisation, with the European union adding speed to the process 
and the intensified pressure on individuals and companies to perform better, 
will lead to significant changes. With an overcapacity of approximately 30% 
(Veckans Affärer, 2002), the established airline industry is under pressure, 
and changes will happen, but what factors will really improve firm 
performance?  
 
 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
 
The airline industry is a controversial industry with its ownership structure, 
subsidiaries, and protectionist strategies. Alliances have emerged as a result 
of the regulated market conditions, and the airline industry has been a leading 
industry regarding alliance making and an icon for many others. The problem 
is just that the alliances themselves have with a few exceptions, been as short 
lived as an average Scandinavian summer (Veckans Affärer, 2002). 
According to Yergin at al (2000), alliances represent an initiative by 
individual airlines, although an imperfect one, to rationalise their operations, 
build more effective market coverage, and offer more seamless, hassle- free 
transportation. Alliances have emerged in an attempt to get round the 
regulatory barriers that restrict every airline’s ability to acquire or merge 
across national borders. Fundamentally, the formation of alliances reflects the 
airline industry’s effort to develop its natural network-based structure within 
the limits imposed by government regulations. 
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During recent years, and especially after the 11th of September 20011, profits 
have fallen and bankruptcy hit, or been close to hitting, far too many of the 
established actors (exemplified by the financially troubled Alitalia, and the 
total collapse of Swissair). In addition, during the past years, low-cost 
airlines2 have challenged the established actors on mostly single routes to 
popular destinations. 
 
The September catastrophe was, by the airlines themselves, given much 
blame for the late economic downturn. Nevertheless, the market trends were 
in fact slowing from the late nineties. The annual growth in passenger traffic 
has fluctuated around 5% during the entire nineties and operating profit was 
declining at the end of the millennium. Figure 1.1 clarifies this trend and 
shows the total profit for IATA3 members. 
 
Operating Profit for IATA members
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Source: IATA, 2002 
Figure 1.1 Average profit margins 
 
These changes in growth, market conditions and profit might also have 
changed the variables affecting firm performance. When size and capacity 
might have been the great advantage in the early nineties, cost effectiveness 
                                                 
1 Terror attack on USA (World Trade Center, NY etc) 11 September 2001. 
2 Low-cost airlines such as Ryanair, Easyjet, GoodJet.com, Sterling and Crossair, among many others are 
competing on few and carefully chosen routes. 
3 IATA (International Air Transport Association) has 280 airline companies as members, approximately 95% 
of all international scheduled air traffic. IATA is a international organization, who’s mission is to represent 
and serve the airline industry 
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could be the important one after the deregulation. An interesting question is 
then; is it possible to capture variables affecting profit margin in the airline 
industry. Further, since the EU deregulated their market later than the US, 
will there be different variables affecting profit margin in these two markets? 
 
1.2.1 Cost Structure for Airlines 
 
The airline industry is relatively homogeneous, as they sell seats and cargo 
space with the intention to transport from one place to another. Hence, there is 
not much room for differentiation. According to the Air Transport 
Association (2002), the airline industry is a very cost intensive industry, with 
huge initial investments ranging from expensive equipment and facilities, to 
airplanes and flight simulators, to maintenance hangars. Further, labour costs 
are huge, approximately 37% of operating costs, since both service and 
maintenance are crucial and mostly regulated by law. On average 11% of the 
labour costs are for maintenance. The industry is also very sensitive to 
changes in fuel prices, which account for almost 13% of operating costs on 
average. 
 
Operating cost distribution
Fuel
12.8%Airports
5.4%
Aircraft
11.3%
Commissions
4.2%
Advertising
1.2%
Interest
3.2%
Food
2.0%
Other
23.1%
Labour
36.8%
 
   Source: Air Transport Association (2002) 
Figure 1.2 Operating cost distribution among airlines, 2002. 
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A natural interpretation from the above findings and discussion is, since the 
cost side of airline operation is so extensive, that costs and expenses should 
have an impact on profit margin. Therefore, the way airline companies are 
able to exploit economies of scale and scope, could be a good way of 
measuring the cost effectiveness in relation to profit margin. 
 
There are different variables that can generate scale effects for airlines. 
Hurdle et al (1989) find that economies of scale are very likely present as 
capacity changes depending on the aircraft size. This factor would depend on 
the way of measuring it, as larger planes are more expensive and so on, but 
capacity wise the scale effect is indisputable. One way of determining this 
scale effect would be to examine the proportion of capacity related costs to 
total operating cost. We expect the economies of scale and effectiveness to be 
significant for profit too, which will later be tested.  
 
The huge investments combined with the large operating costs, make airlines 
in need of vast amounts of cash. The financing of airlines investments, and 
the foundation for operations, could come from either equity or debt. While 
debt is considered cheaper, it is, to a certain extent, also associated with 
higher capital risk. There is no clear optimal capital structure of airlines, but a 
higher degree of equity to assets is often associated with good economic 
condition for the companies. When conditions get difficult, firms easily turn 
to debt for fast cash. The equity to assets ratio is known as solidity, and as the 
name says; higher ratio makes a solid company. The solidity determines the 
degree of losses that can be taken by a firm before the creditors start making 
losses, and would have a direct impact on a firm’s cost of capital (Leigh & 
Olverén, 2000). We consider this important as airlines are so cost intensive 
and thereby so is the cost of capital. Therefore, could a higher equity to asset 
ratio have a positive impact on profit margin in the airline industry? 
 
1.2.2 The US market versus the EU market 
 
As this paper intends to develop a model that captures variables affecting 
profit margin in US and EU, it is at this point important to stress that a direct 
comparison between the US and the European airline market is complex. 
Neither market can be fully replicated on the other, but the two markets have 
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many similar properties and are therefore interesting test objects. They have 
both a large and diverse transport industry. Both are developed regions, and 
driven by the market mechanism, i.e. competition, and market forces drive 
companies. Just as there are many similarities, there are of course a lot 
differences. The following part will clarify the relationship between the two 
markets. 
 
The European Market 
National rivalries within Europe had produced over 100 airline companies by 
the 1980s compared with approximately 30 airlines in the US. Fragmentation, 
excess capacity, and low productivity were accompanied by direct subsidies 
to loss-making state-owned carriers. To keep their national champions flying 
during economic downturns, governments took to heavily subsidizing their 
national carriers. These subsidies ranged from concerning specific routes, as 
well as entire companies (Yergin et al, 2000). National flag carriers is to some 
extent a European historical phenomenon, these carriers are viewed as an 
extension of national foreign policy and pride. The signalling effect of letting 
such a company go bankrupt is one of the underlying arguments of continuing 
to subsidize them. 
 
A major step towards deregulation of the European aviation market came in 
1985 when the European Court ruled that the EU Commission in Brussels had 
the authority to act on airfares. A shift was now created from a national 
aviation policy to the EU commission control. Three broad reform packages 
were adopted that gradually reduced the restrictions on intra-European 
competition (Yergin et al, 2000): 
 
 The first package, adopted in 1987 and phased over three years, 
sought to reduce capacity restrictions, increase routes, and create 
zones with greater fare flexibility. 
 The second package, adopted in 1990, built on the above reform 
sought to further increase market access and the right of European 
airlines to carry traffic between two other European countries as part 
of a flight originating in its home country. It also expanded the 
scope for fare discounting within certain geographic zones. 
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 In the final package, adopted in 1997, European carriers were 
granted full traffic rights within the European Union – including 
cabotage4, meaning that airline companies now were entitled to 
operate domestic service in the other country. 
 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 
1997) states that the above reforms have had a major impact on the 
competitive environment of European aviation. Although the EU Commission 
approved over $11 billion in subsidies to loss-making airlines between 1991 
and 1997, the average yearly amount has since dropped by half and is likely 
to eventually be phased out.  
 
The Swedish business paper Veckans Affärer (2002) states that the EU also 
controls ownership regulations as European airlines are blocked from 
acquiring more than 49% of another European airline. That is, if the home 
nation of the target airline has a bilateral agreement5 with a non-EU state. If 
buying a foreign airline, the EU airline is then to adapt the national regulatory 
system of the target airline’s home country. This meant that SAS could 
acquire the Norwegian airline Braathens, December 2001 (Dagens Näringsliv, 
2001), without facing anything worse than the rage of the Norwegian 
Competition Authority, this is due to the fact that Braathens did not have any 
bilateral agreements with a non-EU state. The Norwegian Competition 
Authority (NCA, 2001) eventually accepted the acquisition but later 
prohibited earning bonus points on domestic routes (NCA, 2002) to 
encourage further competition. 
 
The US Market 
In the US, the situation is slightly different as compared to the European, as 
the market has been much more deregulated for a longer period. The 
deregulation process of the aviation industry began in 1979. Before 1979, the 
Civil Aeronautics Board controlled both the routes airlines flew and the ticket 
prices they charged, with the goal of serving the public interest. Along with 
                                                 
4 Cabotage is the right to pick up traffic in a destination country and fly it to another destination in that 
country. The EU allows unrestricted airline operations only within the EU Single market and only by airlines 
qualified as community carriers. 
5 Bilateral agreement is when two countries enter into an agreement specifying how many routes they can fly 
between each other  
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the deregulation, any domestically owned airline that was deemed "fit, 
willing, and able" by the Department of Transportation (DOT) could fly on 
any domestic route. The primary regulatory role of the DOT changed from 
approving whether an airline was operating in the public interest to deciding 
whether an airline was operating in accordance with safety standards and 
other operating procedures (Gowrisankaran, 2002).  
 
Ownership and routes are liberated but local government still owns and 
manages the airports in their region, and therefore control key bottlenecks to 
airport services: access to boarding gates and runways. If this should be 
deregulated, the way to get access to the airport would probably be handled 
with a normal market mechanism, meaning some sort of bidding process. As 
it is today, the local government often requires proof that the airline would 
operate in the best interest of the public. 
 
From Gowrisankaran (2002) further facts are stated: 
 Since the deregulation in 1979 the U.S have experienced a 225% 
growth up until 2000, while Canada which deregulated its airline 
industry later, and has always had much less competition than the U.S, 
had a growth rate of 80% for the same period. 
 Ticket prices have been decreasing by up to 59% in the U.S between 
1979 and 2000, and in Canada by only 14%. Although average prices 
have fallen in the U.S, unrestricted fares often paid by business 
travellers have risen steadily. 
 
Following the deregulation, many airlines start to operate on a “hub-and-
spoke” system depicted in Figure 1.3. The hub-and-spoke system has allowed 
for efficient connections for passengers from small and mid sized cities, but it 
also has increased airline concentration at hubs. The net effect has been to 
increase the choice of carriers at non-hub cities and to increase the frequency 
of services but also to increase the concentration and congestions at hub 
cities. 
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Source: Fettered Flight: Globalisation and the Airline Industry, 2000 
Figure 1.3 Evolving structure of the aviation market 
 
It is still debated whether the airline industry need government intervention, 
since some of U.S biggest airlines have shut down or been acquired by other 
airlines, for example, Pan Am, Eastern, TWA and Texas air. The main reason 
for these incidents to occur is that profits in the airline industry can fluctuate 
widely. The reasons for these fluctuations are that an airline company’s costs 
are largely driven by labour and fuel, and these costs are fixed in the short 
run, meaning a that a sudden drop in demand can have severe consequences. 
 
Veckans Affärer (2002) points out that although the US aviation market is 
extensively deregulated internally, foreign owners are not allowed to own 
more than 25% of a US airline. The US Department of Transportation have 
raised the question of deregulating the ownership structure several times, but 
Pentagon has objected every time as American airlines are obligated to 
perform transportation services in a war situation. The Pentagon’s reasons for 
this are that foreign airlines cannot be trusted in a war situation. 
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1.2.3 Market Review 
 
In May 2001, the European Union had 14 big airlines and the US had six, 
which were about to consolidate into three or four (The Economist, 2001). 
The main reason for Europe having so many is the national ownership 
structure. Each country has practically its own “national champ” that shall 
survive on bilateral air-service agreements. Since these airlines are practically 
looked at as national symbols, they are to some extent protected against 
acquisitions and takeovers by national law and, to a certain extent, 
controversial subsidiaries. Bankruptcy is practically impossible. Even though 
Swissair went bankrupt in late 2001 a new national airline call Swiss, built on 
the foundation of Swissair, was instantly airborne. 
 
Since the market conditions between EU and US up until 1997 were so 
different, these markets can be divided into two separate markets. 
Furthermore, since these two markets are differently regulated in time, they 
could be good test objects to see if the competitive environment in the US has 
a positive effect on the company profit compared to the EU market. There are 
complications to such a comparison, as both alliances and subsidiaries could 
“make noise” in the comparison. Alliances in the airline industry usually 
mean sharing of ticket sales and frequent flyer miles, and they are attractive 
for marketing reasons and for boosting revenues, which they do by 15-20% 
on average (The Economist, 2002). Although, according to a recent survey 
(The Economist, 2002), they disappoint in finding good ways to cut costs 
together other than sharing airport lounges and city-centre offices. It is 
therefore discussed if alliances really have any major impact on airline 
profits. Nevertheless, since most large airlines are in some kind of alliance 
anyway, the noise should not be too disturbing. 
 
Different activities generate different yields, which also makes economies of 
scope interesting for airlines. This paper will examine passenger airlines, but 
not all airlines have a 100% share of passenger traffic. In addition to 
passengers and excess luggage, airlines could transport cargo. According to 
IATA (1984), cargo is considered a spin-off from supply of passengers. 
Hence, cargo could be seen as a way of exploiting economies of scope for 
airlines. Further, there are two types of passenger traffic, i.e. scheduled and 
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unscheduled (charter) traffic. US airlines have, as mentioned in Table 1.1, less 
competition from charter traffic than EU airlines. According to a study by 
Antoniou (1992), scheduled traffic also generates a higher yield than charter 
traffic. This should indicate a higher profit margin for airlines with a large 
amount of scheduled traffic among its services. 
 
Table 1.1 Main differences between US and EU 
United States Europe 
Consolidated Fragmented 
Larger airlines (Total passengers and 
employees) 
Smaller airlines (Total passengers and 
employees) 
Profitability key driver for route selection Route selection has for a long time been 
driven for political and strategic reasons 
Hardly no fast trains Many fast trains on interurban transportation. 
Railroads are usually state owned with a 
politically powerful workforce. Therefore, 
airlines are not encouraged to compete. 
No competition from charter operators Competition from charter operators 
Lower cost structure Higher cost structure. Due to the fact that they 
are or until recently, state owned. 
Unions less power Unions’ great power leading to more strikes. 
Uniform infrastructure Less uniform infrastructure 
Standard air navigation system Different equipment and operating standards 
among nations. 
Source: Based on information from; Y. Aharoni, European Air Transportation: Integration, Globalisation and 
Structural Changes, 2002 
 
In Table 1.1, the main differences between the two markets are highlighted. It 
can be read from the table that on average the EU airlines are smaller than the 
US counterparts. Further, Aharoni (2002) stresses that in theory, being small 
may be an incentive for a merger and the creation of a large-scale competitor. 
However, many EU airlines are not just smaller and less efficient. They are 
also more diverse in their culture. Most of the European aviation fleet started 
out as flag carriers and therefore might have more difficulties in restructuring 
than the US airlines. Most importantly, they are protected by the “substantial 
ownership and effective control” rules. From the above discussion and 
findings the belief is, everything else being equal, that deregulation could 
have a positive impact on profit margin; but is this the case in the airline 
industry? 
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Moreover, to strengthen the validity of our findings Winston (1998) further 
stresses the following results of deregulation in the airline industry:  
 
 A change from point-to-point system to hub-and-spoke system 
emerged, meaning more frequent departure from smaller towns and 
cities. 
 Increase activity of mergers & acquisitions 
 Lower wages due to increased competition, resulting in weaker unions. 
 Cheaper fares in the U.S with a reduction between 25-75% depending 
on the route, have been observed since deregulation. 
 Cheaper fares have resulted in higher load factors. 
 Innovations have spurred in both technologies, service and marketing. 
 In a deregulated market airline companies prove to have a faster 
response-rate to external shocks, compared to a regulated market 
 Deregulation often means initial high sunk cost, to grasp technologies 
that are more efficient. 
  
Clifford also points out that deregulation is a long-term process. Big airline 
companies cannot change over night and their past behaviour is deeply rooted.  
 
The 1990’s were an eventful decade for the airline industry, with inconsistent 
market conditions over time. According to the ATA’s annual review of the 
airline industry (ATA, 2002), the first two years of the nineties was a low-
growth period. Losses were made and subsidies kept several airlines in the 
air. From 1993 however, the market changed resulting in a period of high 
growth, lasting for four to five years, turning losses into profit. During the 
mid-nineties passenger traffic was accelerating, decreasing frequency of 
delays, and increased fuel efficiency. The last three years was again a low-
growth period and profits were made on average. However, they were 
stabilizing and later falling. 
 
1.2.4 Profit and Performance 
 
Profit margin is a well-known and respected measure of a firm’s performance. 
Profit margin clarifies the relationship between total sales and the earnings 
these sales provide, as this percentage measure indicates the real margin the 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 13
firm has on its operations. Further, as Schranz (1993) points out, shareholders 
are the residual claimants of the firms profit; profit margin therefore becomes 
a significant decision factor when investing. There have been studies 
performed on variables affecting profitability, also in the airline industry 
(Doganis, 1991; Antoniou, 1992; Schefczyk, 1993). However, these studies 
were conducted in the early nineties and do not seem to investigate the effects 
after the final EU deregulation process in the airline industry ending in 1997. 
The US airline industry is many years ahead of the European regarding the 
process of deregulation. According to calculations made by Morrison and 
Winston (1995), airline profits in the US have been greater with deregulation 
than they would have been if the industry had still been regulated. Fares 
would have been higher, but higher wages and less efficient operations would 
have more than offset those gains for the airlines. 
 
We would assume that deregulation should provide opportunities to expand, 
develop and broaden an airlines horizon, but this could be just a little too 
obvious. On the contrary, the established EU airlines might not have been 
properly prepared for the changes and the possibilities emerging in the 
industry. The magnitude of changes like this takes time to grasp and the 
possible opportunities might lie years ahead.  
 
1.2.5 Hypothesis 
 
We have during this problem discussion presented quite a few questions and 
arguments regarding performance in the airline industry. For the coming 
research we will now clarify four hypotheses based on the previous questions 
and arguments, which could affect profitability among airlines, and will later 
be tested in the analysis.  
 
i) Economies of scale could be present in the airline industry 
ii) Equity financing could have a positive effect on profitability 
iii) Market deregulation could have a positive effect on profitability 
iv) Economies of scope could be present in the airline industry 
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The first hypothesis (i) relates to the cost side of airlines and the huge 
operating costs, hence, we expect economies scale regarding size (Caves et al, 
1984), labour productivity, and the vast capacity related costs experienced by 
airlines (also argued by Antoniou, 1992). The second hypothesis (ii) derives 
from the investments and financing aspect, where equity financing should 
have a positive effect on profitability (Leigh & Olverén, 2000). The third 
hypothesis (iii) is market deregulation, hence, a higher performance and 
profitability among US airlines compared to their EU counterparts 
(summarized in Table 1.1). The fourth hypothesis (iv) is that there are 
economies of scope in the airline industry, especially regarding cargo traffic 
(Doganis, 1991 and IATA, 1984), and the share of scheduled traffic 
(Antoniou, 1992). 
 
 
1.3 Purpose 
 
Based upon the problem discussion, the purpose of this study is to identify 
variables affecting firm profitability in the US and EU airline industry, with 
respect to economies of scale/scope, capital structure and market differences. 
Further, we aim to investigate if these variables act differently in the US 
opposed to EU, due to differences in regulatory settings. 
 
 
1.4 Potential Contribution of the Study 
 
To our knowledge no previous quantitative study of this kind has been 
undertaken before. Several studies have been performed on the US 
deregulation process in the airline industry (Button and Keeler, 1993; Bailey, 
1986; Baily, 1993; Kahn, 1988), although, we were not able to find any study 
that compared the two markets (US & EU) in a quantitative manner. Doganis 
(1993) looks at the cost structure of airlines and its impact on profitability, 
Antoniou (1992) examines different variables affecting airline profitability, 
although, he does not separate any markets. Schefczyk (1993) conducts an 
efficiency study on the airline industry. Rundqvist and Schön (1998) carried 
out a study comparing the regulatory environment between the US and 
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Europe airline industry. These studies are all mostly based on qualitative data 
or efficiency studies, and we have not found any study similar to our purpose 
and problem definition relating to the airline industry. The potential 
contribution of this study is therefore to create a clearer view of the impacts 
and importance of further market deregulation and liberal competition of the 
European airline industry.  
 
 
1.5 Assumptions & Limitations 
 
The thesis has several limitations that should be taken into account when 
assessing the relevance of the results. This is not to say that the result and 
conclusion are less valid and relevant but rather that the following facts have 
been kept aside. It would not have been feasible to focus on our purpose and 
conduct a valid analysis if all dissimilarities between EU and the US must be 
taken into consideration. It simply became too great a task. The importance 
and impacts of variables unaccounted for in the analysis will always be a 
possible error-term. We have summarized some of the main differences 
between the two markets, possibly affecting performance, which we were not 
able to identify through the data available. The effects of the following 
assumptions and limitations on airlines profitability is therefore an open 
question. 
 
 Subsidizing. Subsidizing airline companies is an activity that has been 
heavily practiced on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean although to a 
much greater extent in Europe than in the US. The financial data used 
for our analysis does not provide us with this information and therefore 
any possible effect of this activity on airline profit margin cannot be 
tested. 
 Low-cost airlines. After the full deregulation in Europe in 1997, many 
newcomers known today as low-cost airlines started to emerge. This 
business model has been conducted in the US since they deregulated 
their market, many with great success. Since 1997 many entrepreneurs 
and European airlines have tried to duplicate this model into the 
European market. We have not been able to separate these low-cost 
airlines in the analysis. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 16
 Alliances. Alliances are a widely discussed topic nowadays. In this 
report we have not taken this into consideration in our model, this is 
due to the fact that the spectra of our financial data ranges over a nine-
year period. Alliances have come and gone and so have different airline 
companies. There was no data available when the airlines entered or 
left the different alliances so we decided to overlook this variable 
affecting firm profitability. 
 Off balance sheet financing. Off balance sheet financing (leasing, 
factoring and so forth) have not been included in the data and the effect 
on profitability has not been analysed. According to Schefczyk (1993) 
most airlines lease a substantial fraction of their aircraft. This type of 
financing was not present in the financial data and was neither possible 
to obtain for all the airlines in the estimated period. 
 Political environment. Political differences between the two continents 
have resulted in different development and evolution of the aviation 
industry in the two markets. For example, route selection has for a long 
period in Europe been driven for political and strategic reasons, not 
purely for profit as the route selection in the US have to a greater extent 
been. Political differences have been limited to the European Union 
contra the United States, and also the basis for stronger labour unions 
and so forth. 
 Standardization. Moreover, US have a well functioning standardized air 
navigation system that covers the whole country. This is not the case in 
Europe as each nation has for a long time operated isolated from other 
nations, resulting in all nations operating their own air navigation 
system. Any economic effects this standardization has cannot be tested 
through the information available. 
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2. Data & Methodology 
 
In this part of the paper, we will provide the methods of how we collected, 
structured and analysed the data. In this section we seek to describe as clearly 
as possible what has been done in practical terms. In principle, we will 
highlight the investigation process, sample size, details of the techniques 
used, and other specific factors that affected the work. In order to investigate 
and analyse the outcome of the main purpose, we added four hypotheses. 
These hypotheses create the basis for further data-collection and theories, 
followed by a quantitative research model, the analysis and interpretation. We 
have designed a research model (Figure 2.1) where the sequential process of 
the research is defined. 
 
 
 
 
Research      Data collection          Research model,               Analysis 
hypotheses      and theories          quantitative approach             and conclusion 
 
Figure 2.1 Research model 
 
2.1 Research Strategy 
 
The airline industry is interesting for its historical, present, and future position 
on the world business arena, as it has been a key-factor for globalisation and 
world trade. After a vast background study within the industry, many ideas 
and thoughts emerged regarding airlines and performance. Tourism and 
travelling is rapidly growing and markets are expanding, nevertheless airlines 
do not seem to be more profitable. This led us to the problem discussion. 
Finally, the purpose of this study was defined.  
 
As the purpose was defined according to the academic standards at the 
Graduate Business School of Gothenburg University, the next issue is how 
such a problem should be investigated further. Search engines as “jstor” 
(which searches through a number of scientific journals), Google.com, and 
the economic library’s own search engine for e-journals and literature, 
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provided the foundation for the research structure. We searched for similar 
problems and studies made on other industries, in order to create a credible 
theoretical background for the model and the data collection process. 
 
Two Research Models 
According to Johns & Lee-Ross (1998), there are essentially two research 
models to choose from when conducting a research study i.e. the inductive 
and hypothetico-deductive processes. Inductive reasoning involves drawing 
hypotheses from observations by a process of analysis. The model of science 
is called inductive reasoning because the observations are supposed to lead 
naturally to the hypothesis. Hypothetico-deductive, on the other hand, 
involves proposing an initial theory (a rigorously defined hypothesis) which 
can then be confirmed or refuted by experiment. According to this latter 
model, the anecdote provokes the researcher to put forward a hypothesis, 
which then will be tested by experiment to see whether it is supported by 
practical experience. 
 
Two Research Methods 
According to Lekvall & Wahlbin (1993), there are two main research 
methods available: a quantitative method and a qualitative method. A 
quantitative study implies that numerical data is collected and analysed with 
the help of statistical methods and tables. A qualitative method on the other 
hand implies that one examines just a few, or a single object, but where the 
data collected cannot be expressed in numerical terms. Which method can be 
considered most appropriate varies depending on the research question as 
well as the data available. To fulfil the aim of our purpose and test the 
hypothesis, a large amount of numerical data is needed to conduct a statistical 
analysis; hence, a quantitative approach is used for the main analysis. 
Although most variables will be based on financial raw data, some of the 
variables within the regression equations might be evaluated by a qualitative 
approach, i.e. dummy variables. 
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2.2 Our Research Model 
 
In order to achieve our purpose, to identify variables affecting firm 
profitability, with respect to economies of scale/scope, capital structure and 
market differences the problem discussion supported by the theoretical 
framework, lies the foundation for the empirical study of this paper. We 
identify hypotheses, which then further will be examined in our model. 
Therefore, the hypothetico-deductive model is the method for our analysis. 
The method used for this paper is quantitative by nature, as we are 
investigating financial raw data from the airline industry. Further, to 
accomplish our purpose we had to process this raw data into measurable 
numbers and key ratios. Finally, to make sense for the reader and us, the 
measurable numbers and key ratios were run through a multiple regression.  
 
Multiple Regression 
Multiple regressions, also known as ordinary least squares (OLS), seek to 
model data into a relationship between one dependent variable and several 
independent variables. Unlike simple linear regression, it allows more than 
one independent variable to be considered. Our variables, dependent and 
independent, will illustrate the various categories named in the purpose, i.e. 
economies of scale/scope, capital structure and market differences. The 
process of selection for the different variables is one of the crucial parts of 
regression analysis. To capture the essence of these categories requires a great 
amount of research. 
 
The formula for the multiple regression equation is: 
 
  .,3122110 etcxxxy ββββ +++=  
 
where y is the dependent variable and x1, x2, x3, etc. are the independent 
variables. β0 is the value of y when all independent variables are zero and β1, 
β2, β3, etc. are the coefficients which relate the independent variables to the 
dependent variable (Johns and Ross, 1998). 
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2.3 Research Categories 
 
When implementing a statistical model on firm performance there is 
numerous amounts of possible variables. Based on the hypothesis in Chapter 
1, we have identified four distinct categories of variables:  
 
1) Economies of scope  
2) Economies of scale  
3) Capital structure 
4) Market regulation.  
 
Based on a similar study by Antoniou (1992), we believe these categories will 
capture most of the operational differences for airlines, even though the four 
categories will only consist of a few variables in total. We choose to limit the 
amount of variables, as the data available for each analytical period is 
relatively small6. The decision of variables in relation to categories is based 
on traditional economic theory, concerning both company fundamentals and 
market conditions. This is done to increase the validity and produce a rational 
foundation for the analysis and expected outcome. The analysis will also be 
done for several years (1993-1999), increasing the reliability of the produced 
results. 
 
Economies of Scope 
Economies of scope will be referred to as scope activities, i.e. activities 
produced only because another one exists. The core activity of the airlines in 
this analysis is passenger traffic. We have identified two variables to cover 
the area of scope activities for airlines; share of scheduled versus unscheduled 
traffic, and share of passenger versus freight. It is argued that unscheduled 
traffic and freight activities are additional operations for passenger traffic 
airlines. An airline can surely be specialized in charter (unscheduled) traffic, 
but as will be discussed later, the payoff is expected to be considerably lower. 
 
Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale, which is later referred to as scale opportunities, is meant 
to determine the scale advantages that might occur for airlines. Under this 
                                                 
6 The data for US and EU is limited to approximately 50 airlines in total for each year. 
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category, there are three variables; Size, labour productivity, and capacity 
related costs. The ultimate measure of scale would be size, and if magnitude 
improves performance. Productivity and cost effectiveness is also interesting 
considering scale, hence labour productivity and the share of capacity related 
costs are meant to capture possible advantages relating to economies of scale. 
Economies of scale/scope will be further explained in the theoretical 
framework  
 
Capital Structure 
Capital structure refers to the capital risk of the company, i.e. equity over 
asset. This ratio, known as solidity, indicates the riskiness of the company’s 
financial position. For this measurement, we have one variable. European 
companies are on average financed differently compared to U.S airlines. The 
U.S airlines have relatively more equity than their counterparts do and we will 
investigate if this relationship has any effect on performance. Capital structure 
will also be further examined in the theoretical framework. 
 
Market Regulation 
Depending on where an airline operates, differences in restrictions and market 
conditions occur. As argued in the introduction the US deregulated their 
market earlier than the EU market, resulting in a more liberal and competitive 
market than the EU up until the final deregulation act in 1997. The effect of 
this relationship will be investigated; hence, there could be different variables. 
 
 
2.4 Data 
 
The data used for perusing this analysis is provided by ICAO7 (International 
Civil Aviation Organisation) for the Gothenburg School of Economics and 
Commercial Law. It contains detailed accounting data on the income 
statement and the balance sheet, including tonne-kilometres available and 
performed. The data set contains information on airlines from a variety of 
nations, where we sorted out the ones with EU and US origin. We also 
                                                 
7 The aims and objectives of ICAO are to develop the principles and techniques of international air 
navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air transport. For further reading we 
suggest ICAO’s homepage, www.ICAO.org. 
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eliminated the cargo airlines, i.e. an airline whose main activity is freight, not 
passenger traffic, as passenger airlines is the purpose for testing in this paper. 
Some airlines were also eliminated, as there was missing data on one or more 
variables. Initially there was data from 1991 until 1999, but unfortunately 
1991 and 1992 did not contain enough data to be included in the regression 
equation. 
 
Compiling the Data 
The data was initially sorted after the airlines national origin, hence, there was 
no problem separating the different continents. We are aware that we have a 
smaller amount of data on the US airline industry, but as there are also are 
fewer airlines operating within this region, such a consequence was quite 
natural. The selection process left us with 264 observations, where 110 were 
from the US and 154 were EU airlines. The data ranges from 1993 until 1999. 
 
All of the data variables available for us are left to Appendices 1 and 2, but 
the data used in this analysis are listed below: 
 
 Operating revenue 
 Capacity Related Costs: 
o Flight operations (total) 
o Maintenance and overhaul 
o Depreciation and amortization (total) 
o User charges and station expenses (total) 
 Total operating expenses 
 Operating result 
 Equity  
o Unearned transportation revenues 
o Advances from affiliated companies 
o Capital stock 
o Capital surplus 
 Total liabilities 
 Scheduled passenger traffic (T-km performed) 
 Total scheduled traffic (T-km performed) 
 Total T-km performed 
 Total T-km available 
 Number of employees 
 
The data is selected based on the four categories and the variables identified 
within each category. The variables will be presented in detail in Chapter 3, 
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but the validity of the data provided is definitely a matter for discussion. 
When combining different countries in the same analysis and using 
accounting data, the matter of accounting rules and their effect is always a 
possible error term. According to Bernstein (1993), there are several 
limitations to accounting data worth mentioning for this thesis. For example, 
the financial statements contain very little direct information about the 
character, motivation, experience, or age of the human resources. They do not 
contain information about the quality of the research and development. Nor 
can we expect to find any detailed information on product lines, machinery 
efficiency, or advance planning. Finally, cost balances do not; in most cases 
represent current market values. For example, according to Rice (1997) the 
accounting value of a plant (historical cost less accumulated accounting 
depreciation) does not necessarily indicate the market or selling value, which 
is what the manager wants to know when considering shutting down or 
keeping the plant open. 
 
We seek data for the variables before interest and taxes, i.e. operating result. 
Further, when calculating the equity, we eliminate each years retained 
earnings and changes in reserves, so each year’s equity will not be affected be 
the earnings or losses from that year. 
 
Missing values 
There was a hitch concerning the airlines accessible for each year, as the 
various airlines were not present in every year. This means that we can’t 
follow the individual evolution of each company, but have to test a larger set 
of dissimilar observations within each test. If we had only included the 
airlines available for every year, the total amount of data would be very small. 
It was therefore necessary to group the data together, known as pooling. This 
type of data also goes under the econometric category of cross-sectional data. 
 
 
2.5 Interpretation and Conclusion 
 
The aim of the following analysis is not to create a model that explains all 
variations in profit margin for airlines (if we get a significant result, that is), 
but rather to test if the hypotheses are true and if the European airlines 
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perform worse than their US counterparts in various parts of the 
microeconomic environment. We would like to test if the variables in our 
model, affect firm performance, and the ability to market adaptation. This 
means the R-square in the regression output (the output which indicates the 
explanatory value of the model) is not the most central output, rather to test if, 
and with what significance, the variables chosen alter firm performance (in 
other words, significantly different from zero). 
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3. Conceptual Framework 
 
3.1 The Variables 
 
This part of the thesis intends to explain the concept and the background of 
the chosen variables for the model. Theoretical relations will be described, 
although the actual theories will be presented later in the theoretical 
framework. 
  
   The Four Main Test Areas                                                    
 
                                                     
 
                                                                Capital Structure 
        
         Share of Scheduled Traffic                                           
       Size                      Cost Structure 
        Scope Activities         Firm Performance    Scale Opportunities             
    “Operating Profit Margin”                    Labour Productivity 
        Share of Passenger Traffic                                                                                
          
 
                                                     EU versus US 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The four categories and the variables 
 
3.1.1 The Dependent Variable 
 
Operating Profit Margin 
When considering firm performance there are several variables to evaluate. In 
this kind of analysis the relation between revenue and costs are natural. Firm 
performance, observed by an outside investor, is generally the profitability of 
the firm. In addition, as argued by Schranz (1993), the shareholders are the 
residual claimants of the firm’s profit. Indeed, another study in this area, 
Antoniou (1992), considers the operating profit margin (OPRM) as the less 
flawed measure of profitability. Focusing on operating profits (rather than net 
profits or revenue) allows for cross-sectional comparisons between airlines 
from different countries, following different accounting and taxation policies. 
These different policies are subject to different tax and subsidy regimes, with 
different capital gains and losses and different foreign exchange operations. 
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3.1.2 The Independent Variables 
 
Share of Scheduled Traffic 
Scheduled traffic is here an output measure of a firm’s activities, where non-
scheduled traffic is the portion of charter passenger services. Several 
observers, such as Antoniou (1992) and IATA (1984), show that there is a 
positive effect of an increased scheduled component on profitability. It is 
argued that airlines tend to “overcharge” their full-fare passengers in order to 
make up for the loss on their charter-competitive fares. Even though there 
might not always be losses, the profit generated is limited. Charter traffic 
might be considered an effect from economies of scope, from the potential 
contribution to cover aircraft costs. Owning aircrafts is very cost demanding 
and charter traffic can be considered as a surplus activity reducing fixed costs, 
but with an unfortunate side effect that it fades-out some of the profit margin. 
            
Share of Passenger Traffic 
Share of passenger traffic (as opposed to freight) in total traffic is introduced 
as yet another output measure of activities. An earlier study by Doganis 
(1991) documents that passenger traffic generates a much higher yield per 
ton-km than those generated by freight, consequently suggesting a positive 
effect from this variable. On the other hand, a more cautious reasoning would 
lead to the opposite conclusion, as most airlines see freight and cargo as a by-
product arising from the supply of passenger service (IATA, 1984). The 
arguments is that the more freight, the more the airline exploits its excess 
capacity, and the surplus revenue is considered a contribution towards 
passenger cost service. This surplus produced can also be explained by the 
theory concerning economies of scope. Therefore, in relation to passenger 
load factor, the expectation is a negative effect from this variable on 
profitability. 
 
Size 
Since size can provide economies of scale and in some cases diseconomies of 
scale, it is likely to affect the profit of a firm. Research by Caves et al (1984), 
found there were no significant economies of scale between large airlines, and 
that the vast increase in smaller, profitable airline companies proved little or 
no scale effects regardless of size. Since there is no indication of 
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diseconomies of scale for airlines, we expect this variable to be positive or 
insignificant on profitability, as larger companies seems to have a larger 
survival potential (diversification possibility) during tough economic 
conditions.  
 
Labour Productivity 
Productiveness of employees is a very important measurement of 
effectiveness, hence economies of scale. Airlines need both flight and ground 
personnel to operate, a separation between the two groups could have been 
possible. However, separating these two groups for this analysis makes little 
sense, as we are interested in total productivity, meaning that the whole value 
chain is measured. Both flight and ground personnel are needed to make ton-
km available. This productivity measure is clearly an indication of potential 
economies of scale emerging in the airline industry. Labour productivity is 
therefore evidently expected to have a positive effect on profitability. 
 
Cost Structure 
An equally important measure of productivity would be to examine the cost 
side. We examine costs related to capacity, meaning the flight or aircraft 
costs. The remaining are passenger traffic-related, i.e. passenger services, 
ticketing/sales/promotion, and other administrative costs. For a given load 
factor this variable should be negatively related to profitability, and 
negatively correlated with labour productivity. This is also expected to come 
from scale possibilities in the industry; consequently, the relative costs will be 
reduced as the amount of output increases. 
 
Solidity 
The financing structure is included in our model to investigate the debt 
structure of airlines. Debt generates interest payments, which can be a 
significant cash-outlay. Equity in contrast does not require these payments, 
although the firm would expect shareholders to request some return on 
investments. We would expect that a higher degree of equity financing 
relative to debt would have a positive effect on profitability. 
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Deregulation 
Operating under different market regulations is expected to influence the firm 
performance. The two markets (US vs. EU) chosen for this analysis are 
characterized by different market conditions, as the US market is more liberal 
concerning competition and other regulatory settings. Accordingly, the theory 
of perfect competition appears logical. Although such a theory might seem a 
little extreme, earlier problem discussion and the coming theoretical 
framework, will further describe and clarify this relationship. The EU market, 
in contrast is much more restricted, thus, monopoly and oligopoly theory will 
fit this market better. In this market, national routes are often operated by few 
airlines, giving a very quick response rate to a competitor’s action. This can 
be explained by the oligopolistic interdependence (Reekie et al, 1995). 
Despite this internal competition, the market is often separated between these 
airlines giving each their own market, within the market. Because of this 
internal market segregation, a monopolistic pricing strategy might evolve. 
 
Even though market theories on monopoly (Suneja, 2002) suggest a higher 
profit margin for EU airlines, due to the fact that this market has more of the 
monopoly characteristics, the hypotheses in this paper turn the whole situation 
around. We predict that the deregulated market environment, the drive for 
costs cutting measures and the incentive to earn excess profits in the US 
(Winston, 1998), gives the US airlines a potentially higher relative profit than 
its EU counterparts do. As a result, this dummy-variable should have a 
positive effect on profitability, US equals 1 in the dummy variable. 
 
The Period 
An eighth and final variable, not directly related to operations, is the period. 
The period is divided into years, and is added to capture any periodical 
changes. These changes are important from a statistical aspect to capture 
trends in the dependent variable, but years could also indicate a general 
market increase during one of the periods. The direction of this variable is 
therefore insecure, all depending if the market trends go up or down.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3. Conceptual Framework 
 29
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of the variables  
 
Category Definition Measurement Sign 
Dependent PMARGIN = 
profit margin 
100*
Re
Pr
venueOperatingTotal
ofitOperatingTotal   
Scope Activities SHSCH = Share of 
Scheduled Traffic 
100*
PerformedkmtonTotal
PerformedkmTScheduled
−
−      
        + 
Scope Activities SHPAS = Share of 
Passenger Traffic 
100*
PerformedkmtonTotal
PerformedkmTPassenger
−
−        __ 
Scale Effects SIZE = Scale 
effects 
Dollar value of assets  
        + 
Scale Effects LAPRO = Labour 
Productivity EmployeesofNumber
AvailablekmTTotal −      
        + 
Scale Effects COST = Cost 
Structure 
100*Re
CostsOperatingTotal
CostslatedCapacity       __ 
Capital Structure SOLID = Equity 
Financing Ratio 
100*
AssetsTotal
Equity   
       + 
Deregulation DEREG = US 
versus EU 
Dummy variable where 1 indicates 
US and 0 is Europe 
     
       + 
The Period Year  Indication of the years in the different 
periods 
 
     +/-  
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3.2 Statistical Equations 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the four categories (eight variables) to be tested against 
profitability, and Table 3.1 summarizes the variables and the expected 
outcome and impact. Since changes are expected to happen in 1997 due to the 
deregulation in the EU, we divide the data into two periods, i.e. before and 
after 1997. The first period ranges from 1993 until 1996, as we had to 
eliminate 1991 and 1992 because of missing information. The second period 
ranges from 1997 until 1999. Two changes happen around 1997, that is the 
third and final deregulation package in the EU, but also a general low-growth 
period starts in the late nineties (ATA, 2002). 
 
The Equations 
The different equations come naturally from the conceptual framework, and 
all variables are included for every year. As we have a relatively small 
amount of variables, we do not consider this a problem. 
 
For the test on the US airlines: 
PMARGIN = β1SIZE) + β2(LAPRO) – β3(COST) + β4(SHSCH) – β5(SHPAS) + 
β6(SOLID)  +  β7(YEAR)  +  e1 
 
For the test on the EU airlines: 
PMARGIN  =  β1SIZE)  +  β2(LAPRO)  –  β3(COST)  +  β4(SHSCH)  –  β5(SHPAS)  + 
β6(SOLID)  +  β7(YEAR)  +  e1 
 
For both US and EU together when comparing profitability: 
PMARGIN  =  β1(DEREG ) +  e1 
 
For practical reasons we added year as a variable when running the entire 
periods, for no other reason than to be aware of a possible increasing or 
decreasing effect over time. This is not very important for the analysis itself, 
but more from a validity point of view, i.e. trends in variables may cause 
interferences8 in an OLS analysis, and countermeasures must be initiated. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Such interferences may be heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation. 
Chapter 3. Conceptual Framework 
 31
Two Periods 
To summarize the expected outcome before the final analysis, we would like 
to describe the periods one last time. Initially we described the globalisation 
process, of accelerating integration and combined national economies. It’s 
possible with different growth periods in the US and EU, but over time, 
highly unlikely as the airline industry is one of the most global industries. 
Therefore, the outcome from the different periods is expected to have the 
same direction for both the US and EU. According to ATA (2002), the period 
from 1993-1996 is characterized by high growth for both continents and 
regulations regarding traffic and airports in the EU. The period from 1997-
1999 is a low-growth period combined with the launch of the third 
deregulation act in the EU, liberalizing the competitive environment. The 
impacts from the variables in the equations are not expected to change in 
direction, but only increase in strength for the later period. 
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4. Theoretical Framework 
 
This part of the thesis intends to clarify the theories employed to identify the 
variables affecting firm profits. They will be described by their basic content 
and assumptions, and in what way they can be utilized to clarify the airline 
industry. Perfect competition, oligopolistic interdependence and monopoly 
pricing will be explained, followed by economies of scale and scope. 
Furthermore, theory on solidity (capital structure) is also accounted for. 
 
The Business Environment 
The business environment in which the airlines operate is in many ways very 
complex. It therefore becomes hard to pinpoint in which type of business 
environment they exist, perfect competition, oligopoly or monopoly. 
However, as we are focusing on two different markets for this thesis one 
interesting thing must be to separate these markets in some sort of way. 
Perfect competition, oligopolistic interdependence and monopoly cannot be 
applicable perfectly to either of the markets. One reason for this strange 
business environment is due to the fact that the airline industry has 
historically been regulated in both the US and in Europe since the start of the 
aviation industry. This has affected the business environment in many ways 
and in most of their characteristics. One can say that regulations impose some 
sort of monopoly situation in the means of decreased flexibility and less credit 
for innovation. The eagerness to become cost conscious and efficient becomes 
less vital in this case. 
 
Further, as discussed in the problem discussion, companies operating in a 
regulated market environment become less innovative and lose flexibility, 
which in turn leads to slow response to internal and external shocks. 
However, gradually the monopoly situation in the airline industry have been 
relaxed in an attempt to increase competition and to make it affordable for a 
larger set of people to fly. This has led to a more oligopolistic like 
environment where few players controlled the market and controlled the fare 
price they charged. If one airline company tried to cut prices or in any other 
way tried to differentiate itself from the rest of the players, an immediate 
response from the others was expected. So how does the market look today? 
Well, progressively the business environment is becoming more and more 
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liberal, leading to increased competition and more players entering the 
market. According to the Economist (2002) low-cost airlines have entered the 
market and put pressure on the mainstream airlines in both the US and EU. 
One can say that in an regulated market many of the monopoly characteristics 
are present while on the other hand in an deregulated environment many of 
the perfect competition features exists. In between these two extremes 
oligopolistic like behaviour can be observed. In the US there was a clear cut 
from regulation to deregulation, that is to say that the companies were thrown 
from a comfortable seat prior to 1979, to a much more vulnerable seat when 
the deregulated market were implemented. 
 
In Europe the situation has been a bit different as the deregulation process has 
been conducted gradually over a twelve-year period, resulting in oligopolistic 
behaviour between the time of a fully regulated market and today. Today 
Europe is closer to the US regarding the business environment, as the third 
and final deregulation act was implemented in 1997. As discussed in the 
problem discussion we also believe that economies of scale and scope 
characteristics to be present for many airlines and a natural development 
deriving from increased competition. When competition increases and airlines 
companies grow they should be able to grasp these benefits. Further, as 
mentioned in the problem discussion Hurdle et al (1989) find that economies 
of scale are very likely present as capacity changes depending on the aircraft 
size. Finally we intend to measure if capital structure has any significance on 
profit margin, we will use solidity as our ratio for measuring if this 
relationship exists. 
 
 
4.1 Perfect Competition 
 
A market where perfect competition exists has some well-known 
characteristics, such as large number of buyers and sellers, none of who is 
powerful enough to make a transaction that affects the going market price. 
The economic theory of perfect competitive markets requires that the product 
should be homogeneous, as we previously argued to be the case for airlines, 
and that there would be low barrier for new suppliers to enter and operate 
without price or capacity controls. According to The Economist (Oct. 2002) 
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both the US and EU airline industry (after 1997 for the EU) have succeeded 
by allowing smaller-scale operations that arbitrage the cost distortions of the 
larger “sovereign” carriers.  
 
The theory also requires that the consumer should be fully aware of the prices 
being offered by the different suppliers. The new low-cost rivals have all 
implemented a modern IT-platform to handle the customers booking activity, 
this with the attempt to get rid of the middle men, the travel agency. Further, 
in an attempt to keep the administrative cost as low as possible. This business 
model will allow the active customer to be almost fully aware of the ticket 
price offered by the different airline companies. Today, these new entrants 
have shaken the competitive environment in the airline industry. Even so, 
according to (The Economist, 2002) traditional carriers remain essentially in a 
different business from their low-cost rivals, because their networks are more 
complex. And they have all the historical baggage of unions, entrenched 
working practices and so on. So it is very difficult for a network carrier to 
reinvent itself as a low-cost carrier.  
 
Under perfect competition, firms will accept the going market price; hence, 
firms will be price takers, not price makers. Firms will then settle on the 
production quantity that will maximize their individual profit levels. This is 
further illustrated in Figure 4.2 below, where price will be determined by the 
industry’s supply and demand curves, S and D. The individual firm, which 
faces the horizontal demand curve, will accept price P1 and set its production 
to Q1, where price equals marginal cost. 
 
                   Industry                          Individual Firm 
    Price Price & Cost 
 S  MC 
 AC 
    P1  P1 D 
 
 D 
  Quantity Q1 Quantity 
Source: Reekie & Crook, 1995 
Figure 4.1 Perfect competition 
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If the minimum point of the average cost curve (AC) lay below the horizontal 
demand curve, abnormal profits would have been earned. This would again 
tempt new entrants into the industry and the supply curve (S) would have 
fallen downwards until equilibrium was reached, and abnormal profits could 
no longer be earned.  
 
Perfect competition is rarely seen in reality, and this market scenario is not a 
perfect description of the US airline industry, because there are too many 
“unrealistic” and strict assumptions. The immense competition in the existing 
US airline market generates a continuous drive for cost cutting measures and 
for product differentiation, consequently creating opportunities to make 
excess profits. Theory also claims the possibility of earning excess profits is 
non-existent over time (Reekie et al, 1995). 
 
4.1.1 Economies of Scale 
 
Economies of scale are a phenomenon deriving from increased competition 
and globalisation. The common theory of cost anticipates that the long-run 
average cost curve is declining as output is increased because of the 
occurrence of economies of scale (Brealey et al, 2001). There are two 
different ways scale-effects can occur, namely real or economic. Real 
economies of scale take place when, due to technological availabilities during 
the output process, the average input per unit output measured in average 
costs declines. The theory of costs is derived from the long-run average cost 
curve (see Figure 4.1) under the assumption that prices are constant. 
However, in practice there could be economic scale-effects, such as lower 
input prices for bulk purchases. Including such phenomena in theory would 
complicate matters a bit, but eventually contribute to an even steeper sloped 
long-run average cost curve. 
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       The Long-run Average Cost Curve, LAC 
    Cost 
  
 
 
 
                                                                 LAC 
  
  
                                                                                                     Quantity 
         
Source: Reekie & Crook, 1995 
 
Figure 4.2 Economies of scale 
 
Diseconomies of scale are an opposite phenomenon that can occur. Common 
cost theory predicts that the long-run average cost curve will turn upwards, 
after a certain output, because of diseconomies of scale. This inefficiency can 
arise due to large plant size etc, but are usually associated with managerial 
problems and labour relations. If diseconomies of scale should occur in 
airlines, management and labour would be the likely cause. However, we do 
predict economies of scale to be present rather than diseconomies, as larger 
airlines means less power to unions and diversification on routes and markets. 
Caves et al (1984) argue that larger airlines have a cost advantage over 
smaller ones. 
 
4.1.2 Economies of Scope 
 
Economies of scope are another interesting theory for airlines. Scope-effects 
occur if a firm is capable of sharing at least one input between products. If 
total costs of producing these products together are lower than they would 
have been producing them separately, economies of scope exist (Reekie et al, 
1995). Sources for economies of scope can be spare capacity, multi-use 
facilities and so forth. Such arguments are very interesting for airlines since, 
as argued earlier, most airlines see freight/cargo as a spin-off effect from 
access capacity in the aircraft (IATA, 1984). Hence, the amount of freight of 
an airline’s T-km performed, would indicate the scope effects present and 
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taken advantage of for the different airlines. Another interesting scope-
generating variable is scheduled traffic versus charter traffic. According to 
Antoniou (1992) scheduled traffic is supposed to generate higher profit per T-
km, but since additional charter traffic may reduce hours that the aircraft is 
standing on the ground, they help to reduce some direct costs. This behaviour 
may well be good for the airline even though it reduced the profit margin per 
T-km produced. 
 
 
4.2 Oligopolistic Interdependence 
 
Oligopoly explains more of the EU competitive environment, as this 
economic environment is categorized by a few large firms competing against 
one another (mostly within the different nations). These few firms’ behaviour 
is explained by interdependence, which means that any decision one firm 
makes, concerning price, product or promotion, will change the business 
behaviour of competitors resulting in counter-moves, in an attempt to not lag 
behind. As a result, the competitor’s behaviour is largely explained by the 
firm’s own behaviour, and must therefore be taken into account when 
decisions are made. The interdependence makes predictions of changes and 
optimal decision-making difficult. Price leadership and non-price competition 
are methods used to remove or limit the uncertainties of interdependence 
which envelops the decision making process. Unfortunately, such market 
conditions could also lead to cartels, and price cooperation, which are mostly 
illegal for competitive and consumer purposes. 
 
4.2.1 Monopolistic Pricing 
 
Pure monopoly is just as rare as perfect competition, and the EU airlines 
operate in neither a perfect monopoly situation nor a perfect competition 
situation. However, the EU market carries some of the same properties as one 
can find within monopoly pricing. In a monopoly situation, the marginal 
revenue and the marginal cost, creates the equilibrium and determines the 
price taken and the quantity produced (Figure 4.3), assuming profit 
maximization.  
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        Profit Maximizing Monopolist 
 
                                            Price & Cost 
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                                                  P1 
 
 
 
                                         D 
 
 
 
                                         MR 
                                                                                                Quantity 
            Q1 
 
                          Source: Reekie & Crook, 1995 
 
Figure 4.3 Monopolistic pricing 
 
A monopolistic price policy could attract potential entrants as the price 
generates significant excess profits. As a result, the monopolist can lower its 
prices and by so doing force the competitor into a price-cutting competition 
(Call & Holahan, 1983). Therefore, new entrants will presumably not be 
interested in entering the market and the monopoly situation remains, thus 
with substantially lower profit. The firm has then chosen to operate alone with 
a lower, but secure and low-risk profit margin. 
 
4.2.2 Pricing Strategy in Perspective 
 
To summarise the above theoretical standpoint, it should be possible for an 
airline company operating in a monopolistic or oligopolistic competitive 
environment to have a higher profit margin. This is not to say that neither the 
U.S nor the European is operating in any of the above mentioned extremes. 
However, when comparing the two markets there is clear evidence that the 
U.S airlines are operating in an environment nearer to a more competitive 
environment than the European airlines. So in theory the European airlines 
should be more profitable. Moreover, the fact that EU-nations are using the 
airlines as a national symbol is no news, but whether it is the most profitable 
ownership structure is not obvious at all. Decisions might be based on 
securing national interests such as labour security, rather than running the 
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airline with the highest possible profit. Whatever the attractiveness of 
monopoly or state-owned companies might be in theory, their drawbacks have 
come increasingly into view. The article by Yergin et al (2000) argues for 
state-owned firms having difficulties adapting, innovating, and being 
competitive. In addition, too often they are constrained by political 
intervention, particularly prone to strikes, over manning, and poor labour 
relations.  
 
With the above arguments, we assume that the “monopolistic competition” in 
the EU is not better on profitability than the liberal competition in the US. 
The reasoning for this statement is that most of the airlines competing within 
EU lose focus on cost while at the same time trying to cut prices to keep 
entrants at a safe distance. So in this case, the US airlines should be able to 
generate higher profit, compared to their European rivals.  
 
 
4.3 Capital structure 
 
The solidity (capital structure) determines the degree of losses that can be 
experienced by the firm before the creditors start experience losses. It will 
have a direct impact on the cost of capital, faced by the firm. If a firm were to 
increase its equity, it could reduce the capital risk to other creditors but equity 
is the most expensive form of financing because it has to absorb losses first. 
According to Leigh & Olverén, (2000), a measure of this concept is the equity 
over asset measure (solidity). 
 
Solidity is an important factor for many reasons, but foremost and as a starter, 
the following example holds; A company which has a high level of borrowing 
relative to its equity base is subject to more risk than a company that holds a 
lower level of borrowing (assuming all other factors held constant). 
Furthermore, if the geared-up firm is in a volatile business as the airline 
business, it will be subject to even more risk. Take the economic business 
cycle versus the oil-price for example, as the fuel cost amounts to 
approximately 13 percent of the total operating costs for an airline company. 
If then the oil price suddenly increases as it did during the Gulf war, the 
airline company with a high gearing rate might be unable to meet its fixed 
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cost in interest charge. It might then in such a scenario be forced to increase 
fare prizes to such a degree that the passengers will not be keen to fly 
anymore in order to cover their fixed interest costs, and therefore be forced 
into liquidation by the banks (creditors). This is why a company with higher 
gearing it said to be more risky than one with relatively higher equity base. 
Debt financial securities present a lower risk than shares for the finance 
providers because they have prior claim on annual income and in liquidation. 
In addition, security is often provided and binding agreement imposed. 
 
It is appropriate at this time to further stress that in this thesis we are dealing 
with accounting values for debt and equity. The true values (market value) of 
debt and equity could not be carried out because the report is dealing with 
data covering a ten-year period. Further, for the purpose of this study it is not 
vital to discuss the theories of optimal capital structure (if one exists, that is), 
rather an understanding that different capital structures have an effect on 
company performance, and that the formation of capital structure lies at 
neither extreme of the spectra. 
 
 
Gearing level
High
High
High
Low
Low
Low
Overall cost of finance*
Risk of financial distress
 
Note: * This is an assumption and is considered in the text 
 
Source: Arnold. G. Corporate Financial Management, 1998 pp 777 
Figure 4.4 Gearing level 
 
Note the crucial assumption in the figure above. This is just for illustrative 
purposes and it must be stressed that this relationship does not always hold, 
according to Arnold (1998) it will only hold to a certain stage. It is unrealistic 
because as the risk of financial distress rises, ordinary shareholders are likely 
to demand higher returns, and therefore at a crucial point the overall cost of 
finance will start to increase again.  
 
Chapter 4. Theoretical Framework 
 42
One variable that we assume to affect profitability (profit margin) in the 
airline business is the equity/asset ratio, which explains how the company is 
financed. This is not to say that it will be significant for profit margin, but 
rather that it might, and that we will test if it can prove to have a relationship 
with higher/lower profit margin. A part of the reasoning behind this 
assumption is the complex ownership structure within airlines and in 
particular the European state owned airlines. “State owned” is a loaded word 
and you do not need to be a scientist to understand that if you have the state 
providing you with funds, management of that airline is then very likely to 
take on higher risk. In this case more debt and in some cases maybe to the 
extent that when a economic slump comes along the airline will be forced into 
urgent need of additional funds in order to avoid liquidation. According to our 
financial data, the U.S airline companies are on average financed 
approximately 40 percent with equity and 60 percent with debt and the 
European approx. 30 percent with equity and 70 percent with debt. This 
relationship is interesting for many reasons but for this thesis for the 
following: The shareholders should in theory be able to put more pressure on 
the U.S airlines, than on the European, to provide as high profit as possible. 
Airlines should be as efficient as possible on both the revenue side as on the 
cost side, as shareholders have a larger stake in the business. More pressure 
resulting in efficient usage of assets should result in higher profit margin. 
Furthermore, more pressure on management, should in theory, lead to a more 
cost conscious and efficient airline company.  
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5. Empirical Results & Analysis 
 
In this section, we present the quality and characteristics of the data, and the 
results from the analysis. This first section provides descriptive statistics, 
followed by the statistical analysis and comments.  
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
5.1.1 Dependent Variable 
 
First, we would like to describe the evolution of profit margin over time, as it 
is the dependent and most important variable. All the descriptive statistics are 
summarized in the two tables below. Table 5.1 contains all the descriptive 
statistics for the EU airlines, while Table 5.2 contains the statistics for the US 
airlines. 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics on profit margins for EU airlines 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Sample Var. Min. Max N 
1993 -0.015 -0.008 0.075 0.006 -0.262 0.090 25
1994 -0.021 0.016 0.131 0.017 -0.562 0.106 26
1995 0.031 0.031 0.056 0.003 -0.081 0.155 25
1996 0.042 0.026 0.042 0.002 0.001 0.133 13
1997 0.038 0.048 0.070 0.005 -0.249 0.132 22
1998 0.045 0.046 0.091 0.008 -0.275 0.229 23
1999 0.016 0.017 0.063 0.004 -0.206 0.111 20
 
 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics on profit margins for US airlines 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Sample Var. Min. Max N 
1993 0.006 0.002 0.049 0.002 -0.080 0.091 12 
1994 0.013 0.015 0.056 0.003 -0.077 0.103 15 
1995 0.044 0.034 0.044 0.002 -0.054 0.131 17 
1996 0.053 0.062 0.047 0.002 -0.056 0.114 9 
1997 0.064 0.081 0.052 0.003 -0.026 0.150 18 
1998 0.081 0.095 0.068 0.005 -0.062 0.223 19 
1999 0.067 0.077 0.068 0.005 -0.104 0.163 18 
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When comparing the average profit margin (mean from Tables 5.1 and 5.2) 
for every year, we can see a clear indication that the EU airlines under-
perform compared to their US counterparts (Figure 5.1). This is an 
observation that clearly supports the statement in the problem discussion, 
where we argued that deregulated market conditions provide higher 
profitability. In Figure 5.1, we have also added polynomial trend-lines for 
both continents. These trend-lines, based on visual observations, indicate 
steeper downturn for EU airlines when a market slowdown occurs (as it does 
in the later part of the nineties).  
 
Average Profit Margin
-0,040
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0,000
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0,060
0,080
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Poly. (US)
Poly. (EU)
 
Figure 5.1 Profit margin in the US and EU 
 
So far, it seems as the earlier statements on profitability and market reaction 
hold concerning the US and EU airline industry. Consequently, a slower 
response rate to market changes under regulated conditions suggestively 
occur (Winston, 1998), i.e. EU airlines have lower profitability compared to 
the US. 
 
The descriptive statistics also indicate a disturbing issue for the coming 
regression, that is an upward trend in the dependent variable, possibly causing 
autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity when measuring the data according to 
OLS. Both these computation error-terms, indicate trends/patterns in the 
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residuals. If such computation errors exist, an inequitable relation between the 
dependent and independent variables might occur. This will be tested for 
using Durbin-Watson test and residual plots before we go in to the regression 
analysis. 
 
5.1.2 Independent Variables 
 
For the other independent variables, we will not present such detailed 
descriptive statistics for every year, as we are not searching for annual trends 
in these. We rather chose to divide them into two periods since these are the 
chosen periods to be analysed, i.e. 1993-1996 and 1997-1999, which follow in 
the tables on the next page. Table 5.3 contains the statistics for the EU airlines 
and the Table 5.4 contains the same data, but for the US airlines. 
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics, 1993-1996, for the independent variables, EU 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Sample Var. Min. Max N 
Size 3416713 1263159 4377034 1.92E+13 14060.31 16601348 89
Labour 333.66 244.70 457.20 209039.3 24.947 4263.69 89
Capacity 0.639 0.649 0.086 0.0074 0.407 0.857 89
Scheduled 0.942 0.991 0.104 0.011 0.543 1 89
Passenger 0.743 0.747 0.156 0.024 0.501 1 89
Solidity 0.272 0.265 0.139 0.019 0.00048 0.719 89
 
 
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics, 1997-1999, for the independent variables, EU 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Sample Var. Min. Max N 
Size 2238906 160060.4 4971347 2.47E+13 2939.541 22279486 65
Labour 299.87 259.30 189.60 35985.62 44.04 821.10 65
Capacity 0.669 0.659 0.082 0.0067 0.491 0.952 65
Scheduled 0.922 0.987 0.136 0.019 0.380 1 65
Passenger 0.827 0.884 0.168 0.028 0.381 1 65
Solidity 0.254 0.197 0.183 0.033 0.006 0.648 65
 
There are particularly large changes in the descriptive statistics in the two 
periods from Tables 5.3 and 5.4. A few small comments are that share of 
passenger traffic seems to have increased on average from the first period to 
the second, as it has increased from 0.743 to 0.827. Further, solidity seems to 
have dropped a bit from 0.272 down to 0.254, with an increasing standard 
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deviation from 0.139 up to 0.183. Labour productivity has decreased from an 
average of 333.66 to 299.87.  
 
According to our model and the expected outcomes from the variables and 
their effect on profit margin, it seems as if EU airlines have become less 
profitable in the second period compared to the first. The changes in the 
variables that occur between 1993-1996 (Table 5.3) and 1997-1999 (Table 
5.4), all go in the direction of lower profitability, if our arguments from 
Chapter 3 (Conceptual Framework) hold regarding the variables and their 
impact on profit margin.  
 
Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics, 1993-1996, for the independent variables, US 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Sample Var. Min. Max N 
Size 5225013 2690194 5713933 3.26E+13 42270 18104371 53
Labour 391.74 370.08 194.53 37841.12 82.105 1375.22 53
Capacity 0.663 0.653 0.048 0.0023 0.579 0.808 53
Scheduled 0.935 0.995 0.157 0.025 0.287 1 53
Passenger 0.822 0.857 0.145 0.021 0.287 1 53
Solidity 0.381 0.372 0.116 0.014 0.118 0.657 53
 
Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics, 1997-1999, for the independent variables, US 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Sample Var. Min. Max N 
Size 5046515 1370734 6902991 4.77E+13 57809 21767277 55
Labour 373.49 365.97 174.94 30604.26 52.979 871.47 55
Capacity 0.676 0.670 0.0650 0.0042 0.532 0.939 55
Scheduled 0.957 0.999 0.103 0.012 0.504 1 55
Passenger 0.863 0.877 0.111 0.012 0.504 0.999 55
Solidity 0.410 0.399 0.150 0.022 0.002 0.818 55
 
For the descriptive statistics from Table 5.5 and 5.6 on the US airlines, they 
also change fairly little from the first period (1993-1996) to the second (1997-
1999). The interesting observation here is when the EU airline seems change 
to “a lower profitability level” on the independent variables, the US airlines 
change in an opposite direction. According to the directions of changes on the 
independent variables from Chapter 3 (Conceptual Framework), the US 
airlines should have higher profitability in the second period compared to the 
first, and according to Figure 5.1 they do. According to Figure 5.1, the fall in 
profit margin in 1999 is much lower for US airlines than for EU airlines. 
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Further, when EU airlines stop growing after the first period, the US airlines 
seem to continue to increase profitability up until 1998. It is now left to see if 
these changes, based on the above rational observations, materialize 
themselves in the coming regression analysis. 
 
 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
 
The Two periods 
To create a more credible analysis, we divided the data sets into two periods, 
1993 until 1996, and 1997 until 1999. The two periods are in fact one 
booming period for the industry and one considered a low-growth period. In 
addition, we want to capture the final deregulation act in EU, ending in 1997. 
This is an attempt to capture if there were different variables affecting profit 
margins in the EU before, contra after the deregulation. The final deregulation 
act and the economic slowdown in the second period could cause a disturbing 
issue, i.e. two possible changes affecting performance in that period. Isolating 
which effect comes from what could be difficult, even though we are still 
expecting to pick up the possible structural changes in the scope and scale 
variables and the ability to adapt to market changes. 
 
5.2.1 Correlation Matrix 
 
Before we begin with the regression analysis, we must determine if there 
exists any disturbing internal correlation between the variables. Internal 
correlation could cause an unreasonably high R2, also internal correlation 
could create difficulty when deciding which impact came from which 
variable. We divided the data for each continent into two periods; hence, we 
will present two correlation matrices for each continent. According to Hill, 
Griffiths & Judge (2001), we have decided that we will accept correlation of 
±0.70 between the variables. There is no suggested value for internal 
correlation, but since the R2 is not expected to be very high, we believe we 
can justify such a high correlation. 
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Table 5.7 Correlation matrix US, 1993-1996 
US 93-96 Profit 
Margin 
Size Labour 
Productivity. 
Cap. Cost Share of 
Scheduled 
Share of 
Passenger 
Solidity 
Profit Margin 1       
Size 0.26 1      
Labour Productivity. 0.21 -0.01 1     
Cap. Cost -0.29 -0.56 -0.15 1    
Share of Scheduled 0.03 0.35 -0.47 -0.30 1   
Share of Passenger -0.08 0.09 -0.63 0.00 0.90 1  
Solidity 0.43 -0.01 0.02 0.18 -0.05 -0.02 1 
Years 0.36 0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.17 0.20 0.16 
 
 
Table 5.8 Correlation matrix US, 1997-1999 
US 97-99 Profit 
Margin Size 
Labour 
Productivity. Cap. Cost 
Share of 
Scheduled 
Share of 
Passenger Solidity 
Profit Margin 1        
Size 0.07 1       
Labour Productivity. -0.47 0.16 1      
Cap. Cost 0.12 -0.34 -0.41 1     
Share of Scheduled 0.24 0.26 -0.27 -0.18 1    
Share of Passenger 0.41 -0.18 -0.63 0.21 0.75 1   
Solidity -0.22 -0.03 0.32 -0.17 0.27 -0.07 1
Years 0.03 0.09 -0.15 0.09 0.10 0.12 -0.04
 
In Tables 5.7 and Table 5.8, we have presented the correlation matrixes for 
the US. We can see that for the first period (Table 5.7), ranging from 1993-
1996, the correlation between share of passenger traffic and share of 
scheduled traffic is 0.90. This is so high that we will remove share of 
scheduled traffic from the 1993-1996 regressions. The correlation between 
the two variables is reduced to 0.75 in the next period (Table 5.8), but not 
enough to be included in the regression for 1997-1999. For the other 
variables, there are no disturbingly high correlation values. 
 
Table 5.9 Correlation matrix EU, 1993-1996 
EU 93-96 
Profit 
Margin Size 
Labour 
Productivity Cap. Cost 
Share of 
Scheduled 
Share of 
Passenger Solidity 
Profit Margin 1        
Size 0.34 1       
Labour Productivity 0.17 0.07 1      
Cap. Cost -0.08 -0.36 0.16 1     
Share of Scheduled 0.06 0.37 -0.03 -0.26 1    
Share of Passenger -0.21 -0.58 -0.11 0.19 0.22 1   
Solidity 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.14 0.24 -0.03 1
Years 0.26 0.22 -0.06 0.05 0.03 -0.11 0.22
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Table 5.10 Correlation matrix EU, 1997-1999 
EU 97-99 
Profit 
Margin Size 
Labour 
cap. Cap. Cost 
Share of 
Scheduled 
Share of 
Passenger Solidity 
Profit Margin 1        
Size 0.11 1       
Labour cap. 0.09 0.35 1      
Cap. Cost -0.24 -0.43 -0.12 1     
Share of Scheduled 0.16 0.21 -0.03 -0.17 1    
Share of Passenger -0.03 -0.40 -0.47 0.18 0.63 1   
Solidity -0.00 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.04 -0.22 1
Years -0.11 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.11 -0.03 -0.05
 
 
The Tables 5.9 and 5.10 illustrate the correlation for the EU variables. As the 
highest value for any correlation is 0.63, we do not see any problem in 
utilizing these variables in the coming regression analysis for the EU airlines. 
 
The analysis is based on the statistical equations described earlier under 
Chapter 3.3. The basic results are summarized in tables for further 
explanation, but the entire data sets are left to the appendix. The following 
tables contain the coefficients, t-statistics, and the adjusted R2. We would like 
to stress at this point that there was, according to Durbin-Watson test, no sign 
of autocorrelation in any of the regression computations. The Durbin-Watson 
test was performed in SPSS and a Durbin-Watson number was produced. This 
number should clearly differentiate from the critical value of 2.00 if there is 
autocorrelation. The numbers from our regressions were from 1.97 to 2.1.  
Residual plots were also produced for every variable to examine the 
possibility of heteroskedasticity. No obvious indications of such computation 
error were found either, and the residual plots can be found in Appendix 3 and 
4. 
 
5.2.2 The Period 1993-1996, US 
 
When running all the variables (except share of scheduled traffic, because of 
the high correlation) for the first period (First, Table 5.11), not many 
variables proved significant on a 5% level with critical t-value of 2.00. 
According to Table 5.11, we can observe that capacity related costs, solidity, 
and the year variable were significant. None of our variables describing 
economies of scope seemed to be significant during this period. The adjusted 
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R2 was relatively high (R2 = 0.353). Taking into account that only three of 
seven variables are significant, an explanatory degree of 35.3% is not bad. 
 
Table 5.11 Regression analysis for the US, period 1993-1996 
The Regression Output from the US Market 
 
First Period 93 - 96 
             
        Second Period 93 - 96
 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
 
Intercept 0.135 1.1199 0,153 1,838 
 
Size 
 
7.86E-10 0.638 - - 
Labour 
Productivity 4.16E-05 1.070 4,80E-05 1,615 
Capacity Related 
Costs -0.332 -2.189 -0,381 -3,118 
Share of Scheduled 
Traffic - - - - 
Share of Passenger 
Traffic -0.018 -0.347 - - 
 
Solidity 
 
0.185 3.574 0,188 3,712 
 
Year 
 
0.016 2.678 0,016 2,763 
N 53               53 
Adjusted R2 0.353                 0.373 
 
Running a regression with too many insignificant variables can affect the 
outcome, so we decided to run a second regression for this period, named 
“Second”. This second regression contains only four variables, i.e. the four 
variables having the highest t-values during the first regression. Nothing 
happens with the variables that are significant, i.e. capacity related costs, 
solidity, and years. We included labour productivity in the second regression, 
and the t-value increased but not enough to reach a 5% level of significance9. 
By reducing the number of insignificant variables in the equation, we 
managed to increase the adjusted R2 to 0.373, which means our model has 
now an explanatory degree of 37.3%. Moreover, all the mentioned significant 
variables are significant not only on a 5% level, but even on a 1% level as the 
critical value for a 1% level is 2.66 and all our respective t-values are higher 
than that. 
                                                 
9 For the record, labour productivity is significant on a 11% level 
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We would also like to stress that the directions of the significant variables, 
meaning the positive or negative impact they have on profitability, were just 
as expected. Reduced capacity related costs, increased solidity and the market 
conditions for airlines, have a positive effect on profit margin during this 
period. Reduced capacity related costs were also proven by Antoniou (1992), 
but in addition he got the labour productivity, share of scheduled and 
passenger traffic significant in his data from the year 1985. 
 
5.2.3 The Period 1997-1999, US 
 
For this period, the results from the variables are different, as Table 5.12 
shows, and we therefore divide the data in two regressions (First and 
Second). In the first regression labour productivity is the only variable 
significant, but only on a 10% level, with a t-value of –1.718 where the 
critical t-value is –1.67. The adjusted R2 is naturally low with its 0.197, as 
barely one variable goes clear. 
 
According to the second regression, which is not a multiple regression, but 
only contains labour productivity as independent variable, we can clearly 
observe that the labour productivity measure is quite important for 
profitability, with a t-value of –3.193 and the critical value is only 2.00 on a 
5% level. Actually, the adjusted R2 has also increased to 0.203, which means 
that labour productivity explains alone 20.3% of US airlines profitability. 
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Table 5.12 Regression analysis for the US, period 1997-1999 
The Regression Output from the US Market 
 
First Period 97 - 99 
                 
           Second Period 97 - 99 
 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
 
Intercept 0.021 0.148 0,129 7,757 
 
Size 1.59E-09 1.345 - - 
Labour 
Productivity -0.0001 -1.718 -0,00016 -3,913 
Capacity Related 
Costs -0.005 -0.036 - - 
Share of Scheduled 
Traffic - - - - 
Share of Passenger 
Traffic 0.130 1.469 - - 
 
Solidity -0.044 -0.889 - - 
 
Year -0.005 -0.569 - - 
N 55                  55 
Adjusted R2 0.197                   0.204 
 
Labour productivity, was as mentioned proven significant, also with a 
satisfying explanatory value for being only one independent variable in a 
regression. What makes this result special is that it affects profitability 
negatively, which means that airlines with “low” labour productivity have the 
highest profit margin. This clearly contradicts the hypothesis, and the study 
by Antoniou (1992).  
 
5.2.4 The Period 1993-1996, EU 
 
The absence of explanatory variables from the regressions in the period 1993-
1996 (Table 5.13) is not really surprising, although the result contradicts 
practically every hypothesis that we stated regarding the independent 
variables and their impact on profit margin. This result supports the earlier 
arguments of inefficient airlines in a regulated environment. The few 
exceptions in this result are for size and the variable for years. After the 
second regression (to eliminate some insignificant variables and increase the 
explanatory degree, R2 from 0.109), it is quite clear that larger airlines 
generate higher profit margin, as size has a t-value of 2.810 and critical value 
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is 2.00 on a 5% level. Years has a slightly lower t-value of 2.02, but still goes 
clear of the 5% level and significance. The R2 increases to 0.146, which still 
is quite low, considering our model only explain 14.6% of EU airlines profit. 
 
Table 5.13 Regression analysis for the EU. period 1993-1996 
The Regression Output from the EU Market 
 
First Period 93 - 96 
 
       Second Period 93 - 96 
 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
 
Intercept -0.0001 -0.001 -0,067 -2,904 
 
Size 6.35E-09 1.802 5,89E-09 2,810 
Labour 
Productivity 3.26E-05 1.583 3,17E-05 1,616 
Capacity Related 
Costs -0.035 -0.291 - - 
Share of Scheduled 
Traffic -0.055 -0.453 - - 
Share of Passenger 
Traffic 0.013 0.148 - - 
 
Solidity -0.024 -0.340 - - 
 
Year 0.019 1.964 0,018 2,020 
N 89            89 
Adjusted R2 0.109               0.146 
 
As we stated, the results from this regression contradict almost all 
profitability hypotheses, but support the fact that EU airlines under perform 
compared to US airlines. Defining a model that explains EU airlines profit 
margin seems much more complex and possibly more individually oriented, 
than explaining the profit margin for US airlines. We will continue with the 
second period, from 1997-1999 to see if any changes have happened to the 
independent variables and their effect on profit margin. 
 
5.2.5 The Period 1997-1999, EU 
 
For this period, we also had to do two regressions, the first and the second in 
Table 5.14. The first regression gives a vague indication that capacity related 
costs are relevant to profit margin, but with a t-value of –1.540 and adjusted 
R2 of pitifully 0.00. Therefore, we made the second regression and capacity 
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related costs proved significant on a 5% level, with a t-value exactly like the 
critical value of 1.98. The adjusted R2 also increased to 0.044, which indicates 
that capacity related costs only describe 4.4% of profit margin. 
 
Table 5.14 Regression analysis for the EU, period 1997-1999 
The Regression Output from the EU Market 
 
First Period 97 - 99 
 
        Second Period 97 - 99 
 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
 
Intercept 0.130 1.074 0,183 2,408 
 
Size -2.26E-09 -0.791 - - 
Labour 
Productivity 1.73E-05 0.277 - - 
Capacity Related 
Costs -0.201 -1.540 -0,223 -1,981 
Share of Scheduled 
Traffic 0.159 1.202 - - 
Share of Passenger 
Traffic -0.097 -0.804 - - 
 
Solidity -0.033 -0.616 - - 
 
Year -0.010 -0.817 - - 
N 65 65 
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.044 
 
Based on studies by Winston (1998) and Yergin et al (2002) the assumption is 
that the third deregulation act should affect firm performance for EU airlines. 
The natural assumption is that airlines gradually adapted during the years 
before 1997, making them better suited to the new liberalized competitive 
market. This does not prove to be the case. The result presented here actually 
upholds the arguments in our problem discussion, where firms operating in a 
regulated environment fail to effectively adapt to market changes. The 
incentive to change, provided by the deregulation act, did not have any 
immediate effect on profit margin. It could possibly have faded in the market 
slow-down as at least one scale effect proved significant. However, we see 
this as highly unlikely as a market slow-down in itself should have forced 
economies of scale in to the EU airline industry. 
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5.2.6 Summary of Regression Results 
 
Table 5.15 The significant variables for the two periods for US and EU 
US Airlines EU Airlines  
1993-96 1997-99 1993-96 1997-99 
Size   +
*  
Labour Productivity   +
**    +***   +**  
Capacity Related Costs +
*   + 
Share of Scheduled Traffic     
Share of Passenger Traffic     
Solidity +
*    
Year +
*  +  
* significant on a 1% level 
** only significant on 11% level, where the others are significant at a 5% level 
*** opposite effect on profitability than predicted 
 
The results from our regressions differ between US airlines and EU airlines. 
The significant variables in each equation are summarized in Table 5.15. We 
have clear indication through the relatively high R2, that our variables 
describe parts of the profitability among US airlines. With the low R2 and the 
few significant variables for EU airlines, the general profit margin seems still 
unexplained. An unproven argument is still if US airlines have higher 
profitability than EU airlines, which will now be tested.  
 
 
5.3 Statistical Comparison of Profitability in US versus EU 
 
5.3.1 Chow Test for Model Significance 
 
The model used for US and EU airlines, included the same variables, and 
were based on the same data background. The data were also divided into two 
periods, i.e. 1993-1996 and 1997-1999. An open question is still if the two 
continents are comparable with the same model. According to, Hill et al 
(2001) there are tests for model significance and one such test is a Chow test. 
The Chow test makes it possible to compare US and EU, and to see if the data 
for the variables in the two continents are applicable in the same regression 
model. The null hypothesis in a Chow test is if the two data sets are 
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comparable with one another in the same model. There are two alternative 
outcomes from this test: 
 
1).  Keep null hypothesis. The model is significant for both US and EU and 
only a shift in the regression curve is a possible difference. This indicates that 
the data for the variables are comparable and a joint analysis of US and EU 
can be performed. 
 
2). Reject null hypothesis. The data sets contain too large differences to be 
compared, or pooled in the same model. Comparing results from US and EU 
will not be feasible with this outcome. 
 
A Chow test, also known as an F-test, produces an F-value based on the “sum 
of squared residuals” generated by the regression10. This F-value is compared 
with a critical value from an F-distribution Table. There are two equations in 
this test (1. and 2. below), where the first tests if the two continents can be 
together in a model, and the second tests whether they are stable, hence, if US 
can explain EU.  
 
The first tests if we can run US and EU in the same model, using the equation 
1. below. 
 
1.  
)1/(
/)(
−−
−=
knRSS
nRSSRRSS
F
EUEU
USEU  
 
The second tests if US is appropriate to explain EU, using the equation 2. 
below. 
2. 
)1/(
/)(
−−
−=
knRSS
nRSSRRSS
F
USUS
EUUS  
 
                                                 
10 The RRSS in equations 1. and 2. stands for “the sum of squared residuals” in a regression containing both 
US and EU data and all variables. The RSSEU or US stands for “the sum of squared residuals” for individual 
regressions of US and EU. These residual values are standard output in regression analysis. The n is number 
of observations and k is degrees of freedom. 
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The result from these two tests is presented together with the appropriate 
critical values. We have chosen to use a critical value on a 1% level, since all 
results are either accepted or rejected no matter what thecritical value. 
 
Table 5.16 Chow test for model significance and data stability  
The Periods F-value for the 
first test (1.) 
F-value for the 
second test (2.) 
Critical 
Value (1%) 
1993-1996 0.335 3.247 1.84 
1997-1999 0.66 1.986 1.84 
1993-1999 0.565 2.589 1.00 
 
According to the results presented, in Table 5.16, we must keep the null 
hypothesis for all periods regarding the ability to test US and EU data 
together. This means that the data collected for the two continents is stable 
regarding the residuals, and this test then indicates a likelihood that these two 
samples describe the same factors. In other words, the two data sets are alike 
in structure and should cover the same areas.  In the second test, we must 
reject the null hypothesis that the US data explains the EU data. According to 
Hill et al (2001), this means that the two data sets contain such differences 
that one cannot explain the other, but as in the first test, they are likely to 
cover the same area of exploration.  
 
5.3.2 Highest Profit Margin  
 
The previously proven distinction between US and EU is important as one or 
several factors must differ, although the data sets are consistent regarding the 
variables. As we can see from the earlier regression analysis in Tables 5.11 
and 5.12, the same variables are obviously not explanatory variables for both 
US and EU, at the same time. To answer the third hypothesis that profitability 
should be higher in the US, we run a regression with both continents pooled 
in a regression. Profit margin was set as the dependent variable and a dummy 
variable for US/EU as independent, and the periods were again split in two. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.17 Results from the dummy regression on profitability and US/EU 
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Periods Coefficient t-value Adjusted R2 
1993-1996 0.024 1.742 0.014 
1997-1999 0.037 2.951 0.059 
1993-1999 0.034 3.523 0.042 
 
 
From the dummy test, we found that profitability is higher for US airline than 
for EU airlines, as the critical value for the t-test is 2.00 on a 5% level on the 
second period from 1997-1999. The first period is also significant but only on 
a 90% level where the critical t-value is 1.70. For the entire data series US 
proves to be better yet again. We must stress that the R2 is very low in all 
regressions.  
 
Comments on the low R2 
The R2 is low in all our regressions (Tables 5.11 to 5.14) considering the 
amount of variables present. Clearly, a higher degree of explanation would 
have been beneficial. The R2 from the dummy analysis (Table 5.17) is also 
low, approximately 5% explanation for one single dummy variable. Although 
this is low, we believe we have proven that there are differences, possibly due 
to regulation, and that US perform significantly better than EU airlines. 
 
 
5.4 Review of the Analysis 
 
The airline industry has gone through major structural changes. These 
changes are results of deregulation and other government policies but also a 
reaction to changes in technology, mainly IT, and to an increasing global 
demand for air transportation of both freight and passengers. The US airline 
industry has shown the way for the deregulation process as it deregulated the 
industry twelve years before the European airline market. There appear to be 
many dissimilarities when comparing these two markets; The US market has 
fewer but larger companies, less fast-trains competing on short-haul routes, 
less competition from charter operators, lower cost structure, the labour 
unions have less power, a uniforme infrastructure, and finally they have a 
standard air navigation system. Apart from the above-mentioned differences, 
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the European airline market has, for a long period, been protected by their 
ownership structure, subsidiaries, and protectionist strategies. 
 
5.4.1 Similar Data for US and EU 
The two markets have many similarities, which made the two markets 
interesting as test objects for this thesis. Deregulation is said to bring forward 
many effects into the business environment and this was also the basis for the 
analysis.  
 
The Joint F-test that we conducted, also known as the Chow test, proves that 
the data for the US and EU variables are based on the same content, it also 
clearly proves that differences in the variables between US and EU exist. This 
means that the variables affecting profit margin in the US do not necessarily 
have to affect profit margin in EU. 
 
5.4.2 Highest Profit Margin for US Airlines 
In addition, we further prove using a dummy regression that profitability is 
higher for US airlines compared to EU airlines. This supports the earlier 
arguments that operating in a deregulated market environment should 
generate higher profit margin. Where Winston (1998), Gowrisankaran (2002), 
and Rundqvist and Schön (1998) claim this to be true from a qualitative 
standpoint, we prove this statement using regression approach. We believe 
this relationship to derive from the fact that the US market is more liberal 
concerning the competitive environment, meaning that the US airlines are 
forced to operate more efficiently in order to stay in business, and therefore 
can show a higher profit margin. This has not been the case in Europe up until 
the final deregulation act in 1997. The regulatory environment in Europe has 
before 1997 kept the European airlines under rigorous control, resulting in 
reduced flexibility and difficulties to adapt to internal and external shocks. 
Any immediate effect of this deregulation seemed to be the case.  
 
5.4.3 The Period 1993-1996 
The factors we have utilized as independent variables to explain profitability 
among airlines, was supported by theory and previous studies on profitability 
(Antoniou, 1992; Doganis, 1991; Caves et al, 1984; Leigh & Olverén, 2000). 
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Even so, the significance was not convincing for the lot of the variables. They 
also clearly deviated from US to EU airlines, as Figure 5.2 illustrates.  
 
We argued earlier that US airlines should have a higher degree of cost 
effectiveness evolving from the liberal competitive market situation. Two of 
our variables from economies of scale, i.e. capacity related costs and labour 
productivity (labour, only to a smaller extent), seems relevant for profitability 
among US airlines in the first period 1993-1996. In addition, solidity was 
significant for US airlines in that period, which were argued since airlines are 
in constant capital need from large investments and operating costs. The 
variable for the time aspect, years, is also significant, and indicates a general 
increasing trend in profitability, most likely a high growth market period (see 
Figure 5.2). The regression also indicates that the model explains 37% of 
profitability among airlines. This is relatively high, in the context of few 
significant variables. 
 
On the other hand, EU airlines do not get the same significant variables as the 
US airlines. These findings support the earlier arguments that effectiveness 
etc might not materialize itself in the same way as in a regulated market. Size 
is clearly significant, this could indicate that market power, and control are 
important. Labour productivity could have a smaller effect on profit, but in 
contrast to US airlines, capacity related costs are not significant here. The 
time variable becomes significant, even for EU airlines, which makes the 
assumption that a general increasing market trend affects airlines overall 
positively (see Figure 5.2). The regression indicates that the model explains 
14% of profitability among EU airlines, although a low number, it is a good 
indication that different variables affect EU airlines versus US airlines. 
 
US profit margin                Variables   EU profit margin 
     
1993-96    Size     1993-96 
 Labour productivity 
    Capacity related costs  
 Share of scheduled traffic   
1997-99 Share of passenger traffic   1997-99 
 Solidity 
 Year 
Figure 5.2 Variables affecting profit margin in the two markets 
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Two variables were not significant for the US or EU in any period or year, i.e. 
share of scheduled traffic and share of passenger traffic (see Figure 5.2). 
Antoniou (1992) found these to be significant in the directions argued in 
Chapter 3, but there are no signs of this from our results. Antoniou’s data was 
from 1985 and one explanation could be that the market situation has changed 
and become tougher during the past decade. A reason for this insignificance 
might be that airlines were during these years forced to cut prices in all 
operations, despite regulatory environment, eliminating excess profit 
opportunities. 
 
5.4.4 The Period 1997-1999 
For this low growth period, 1997-1999, the results were quite surprising for 
both US and EU airlines. The only significant variable for US airlines was 
labour productivity, but the impact was in the opposite direction from what 
we expected. This unexpected result indicates that the more employees per 
tonne-kilometres, the higher the profit margin. The airline industry is a 
service industry and one explanation for this result could be just that; the 
more employees one can have on hand in relation to tonne-kilometres 
available, the better one can serve the customers. This only seems to occur in 
a low-growth period, not in the high growth. A possible explanation could be 
that business travellers are more important in a low-growth perspective. 
Business travellers are the highest paying customers as they fill only a fifth of 
the seats but provide half of the revenue (The Economist, 2002), and for 
business travellers flexibility is highly appreciated along with quality and 
comfort. To obtain such a service level, the airline needs to increase the 
amount of labour.  
 
Again, the regression produces a different result for EU airlines, as only 
capacity related costs are significant for the last period from 1997 to 1999 
(see Figure 5.2). In 1997, the third deregulation package was initiated and we 
assumed a possible change in variables affecting profitability. The change 
occurred but not in any conclusive direction. Far too few variables are 
significant for such a conclusion. The fact that capacity related costs are 
significant could indicate that EU airlines have become more cost effective, 
possibly explained by the liberalized competition followed by the emergence 
of low cost airlines.  
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5.4.5 Closing Remarks 
There could be several reasons for these unexpected results. Airlines are large 
organisations, which makes it difficult for them to change in a short period. 
We expected the changes for EU airlines to be clearer and several variables 
significant in the second period, due to the final deregulation. Nevertheless, 
when markets change, not all players can keep up. 
 
In the limitations in Chapter 1.5 we described subsidizing and off balance 
sheet financing. The ability to obtain subsidies on single routes or for entire 
companies is an error term that unfortunately had to be excluded. The 
economic effect on profit and operations could therefore be significant. The 
same is the case with off balance sheet financing. When leasing aircraft or 
services, the balance sheet might not represent the same assets and cost 
picture as for airlines that own all their planes. Leasing can have effects on 
the equity/asset ratio (Arnold, 1998), which we use as a measure of capital 
structure. Depending on how the company treats their lease expense, this can 
have implications for this ratio. According to Arnold (1998), there are two 
types of lease arrangements; operating and financial lease. Operational lease 
commits the lessee to short-term contracts or one that can be terminated at 
short notice. With a financial lease on the other hand, the financial provider 
expects to recover the full cost (or almost the full cost) of the equipment, plus 
interest, over the period of the lease. When leasing in contrast to debt 
financing, the leasing does not appear as a liability. The solidity ratio 
therefore seams to be higher than what it in fact is if the asset was purchased 
with debt. When decreasing the assets by leasing, the annual assets turnover 
rate will increase, which could result in an unjustified high productivity on the 
assets compared to peers. 
 
However, according to Arnold (1998), new accounting treatments have been 
implemented in an attempt to overcome this. Before the new treatments a 
company could by leasing reduce its gearing ratio and therefore improving its 
chance of obtaining more borrowed funds. The effects of these accounting 
tricks have not been treated in this thesis, since we are dealing with 
accounting data from 1993-1999, and due to the fact that new treatments of 
these effects are evolving all the time. Another pitfall according to Schefczyk 
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(1993) with leasing in the airline industry is due to tax regulations; the airline 
might prefer to purchase the aircraft through a wholly owned subsidiary in a 
low corporate tax regime. In order to accumulate equity in the low-tax 
subsidiary and minimize total tax liabilities in the parent company, the parent 
company might obtain the aircraft through a capital lease with an artificially 
high rate. In this case, the resulting expense should indicate inefficient use of 
the aircraft. However, Schefczyk (1993) also points out that details of such a 
transaction will not be published. If US airlines lease more assets than EU 
airlines, this could create an unfortunate difference.  
 
One earlier limitation relates to the political environment. There is a political 
aspect, where the differences in political environment within Europe are still 
significant. For example, route selection in Europe has been driven for 
political and strategic reasons, not purely for profit as the route selection in 
the US. There is also a high degree of government ownership among the 
traditional European airlines, which could make the ability to change even 
more complex and time consuming. The same political aspect has also 
affected the labour market, as labour unions in the EU have greater power 
than they have in the US. This might affect the profitability as the labour 
force in Europe are more secure than in the US, making the cost of laying off 
employees in the US much less than in Europe. 

Chapter 6. Conclusions 
 65
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper intends to identify variables affecting firm profitability in the US 
and EU airline industry, with respect to economies of scale/scope, capital 
structure and market differences. Further, we aim to investigate if these 
variables act differently in the US opposed to the EU market, due to 
differences in regulatory settings. The above arguments all deal with the 
hypotheses from the problem discussion, which we later tested in the analysis 
in Chapter 5. Below, we present a brief summary of the hypotheses and their 
respective answers: 
 
i) Economies of scale could be present in the airline industry 
- Evidently they are, and to a larger extent for US airlines 
 
ii) Equity financing could have a positive effect on profitability 
- The analysis proves this to be the case for US airlines in the first 
period, but not in the second. For EU airlines this variable was not 
significant in any of the two periods 
 
iii) Market deregulation could have a positive effect on profitability 
- The fact that US airlines have higher profit than their EU 
counterparts seems indisputable 
 
iv) Economies of scope could be present in the airline industry 
- According to our variables for economies of scope, the airline 
industry does not seem to have these possibilities in relation to the 
variables we tested 
 
These hypotheses were the basis for the analysis of the airline industry. When 
analysing for economies of scale and scope, we expected to find a difference 
between the US and the EU market. As the previous section describes, a 
difference is quite clear, but a consistent relationship between the variables 
and profitability is not that obvious. The change in variables affecting 
profitability from a high-growth to a low-growth period and the effect of 
deregulation, is not as expected. The fact that our model seems to explain a 
high-growth period better than a low-growth period, is in itself interesting; 
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obviously the airlines operations and the relation to profit changes, depending 
on the market situation. 
 
There is a clear indication that US airlines have a higher profit margin than 
EU airlines, and this is probably the result of the differences in market 
environment. The variables tested were more significant for US airlines, and 
they explained a higher degree of profit margin. Our findings point towards 
further deregulation for open skies across nations and continents, to create 
stability and efficiency in the industry. This result is further backed by Barry 
Humphrey’s AGM speech this year (2002) as chairman of IATA’s Task Force 
on International Aviation Issues, in which he states the importance of 
liberalization and deregulation for profitability, efficiency, and stability in the 
airline industry11.  
 
After the final deregulation in Europe, the competitive situation increased. 
The infrastructure was already well developed with rail and fast-train 
competition, but the deregulation opened another segment; low cost airlines. 
Low-cost airlines are increasing their market share continuously, and the 
emergence of this new segment has increased the competition further. The 
effect of this new segment on established actors could be an interesting topic 
for further research.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Barry Humphrey’s AGM speech can be found in its entirety on IATA’s Web page, www.iata.org/ 
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Appendix 1 
 
Data for EU airlines 
 
Below we present the data and the variables for the EU airlines we 
investigated. They are presented by years. 
 
State Name Year 
Profit 
Margin Size 
Labor 
Prod. 
Cap. 
Cost
Share of 
Scheduled 
Share of 
Passenger Solidity
AUSTRIA TYROLEAN AIRWAYS 1993 0,088 146009,667 161,135 0,561 1 1 0
AUSTRIA AUA 1993 -0,087 1227141,08 202,676 0,599 1 0,795 0,356
BELGIUM SABENA 1993 -0,019 1958313,963 160,52 0,569 1 0,582 0,221
FINLAND FINNAIR 1993 0,042 1163043,947 229,126 0,756 0,694 0,504 0,284
FRANCE AIR FRANCE 1993 -0,059 11276891,93 339,977 0,54 0,997 0,581 0,08
FRANCE AIR INTER 1993 -0,017 1473547,91 129,718 0,732 1 0,948 0,363
GERMANY LUFTHANSA 1993 -0,001 9029478,717 352,956 0,475 0,999 0,522 0,286
GREECE OLYMPIC 1993 -0,054 835436,889 169,061 0,566 0,989 0,831 0,141
ITALY ALITALIA 1993 -0,01 2945571,1 317,439 0,626 0,99 0,612 0,317
ITALY ATI 1993 0,05 485137,644 4263,691 0,759 0,875 0,858 0,22
ITALY MERIDIANA 1993 0,046 229580,835 223,419 0,674 0,939 0,922 0,166
PORTUGAL TAP AIR PORTUGAL 1993 -0,262 946496,078 160,437 0,477 0,962 0,763 0,403
SCANDINAVIA SAS 1993 -0,008 4604269,95 187,692 0,549 0,998 0,776 0,251
SPAIN BINTER CANARIAS 1993 -0,118 90442,031 192,812 0,758 1 0,924 0,403
SPAIN IBERIA 1993 -0,048 4435838,61 192,412 0,604 0,999 0,78 0,408
SWITZERLAND SWISSAIR 1993 -0,005 4272159,901 251,102 0,65 0,998 0,561 0,282
UNTD KINGDOM AIR UK 1993 -0,008 187825,708 114,726 0,649 0,961 0,945 0,097
UNTD KINGDOM LOGANAIR 1993 -0,081 23642,89 50,654 0,714 0,992 0,983 0,301
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH AIRWAYS 1993 0,086 11390331,57 330,76 0,53 0,998 0,731 0,214
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH MIDLAND 1993 0,001 168589,696 136,004 0,63 0,582 0,554 0,05
UNTD KINGDOM CATHAY PACIFIC 1993 0,09 7193811,456 516,598 0,696 0,986 0,567 0,19
UNTD KINGDOM GB AIRWAYS 1993 0,02 14760,698 508,989 0,719 0,759 0,714 0,396
UNTD KINGDOM JERSEY EUR. AIRWAYS 1993 -0,039 30953,438 60,575 0,692 0,972 0,96 0,046
UNTD KINGDOM VIRGIN ATLANTIC 1993 -0,032 332350,784 667,517 0,585 1 0,743 0,274
AUSTRIA AUA 1994 -0,027 1307569,716 206,577 0,6 1 0,79 0,316
FINLAND FINNAIR 1994 0,094 1456090,883 258,61 0,707 0,821 0,619 0,4
FRANCE AOM-MINERVE S.A. 1994 -0,043 164085,964 723,221 0,777 0,922 0,748 0,194
FRANCE AIR FRANCE 1994 -0,039 9815874,466 323,515 0,673 0,996 0,539 0,215
FRANCE AIR INTER 1994 -0,002 1663781,959 142,138 0,725 1 0,945 0,359
FRANCE TAT EUROPEAN AIRLINE 1994 -0,133 346097,987 83,969 0,522 0,889 0,667 0,083
GERMANY EUROWINGS 1994 -0,02 174098,869 100,715 0,727 0,897 0,897 0,088
GERMANY LUFTHANSA 1994 0,035 9605552,924 370,909 0,476 0,997 0,503 0,44
ITALY AVIANOVA S.P.A. 1994 0,032 34458,8 24,947 0,767 0,973 0,973 0,143
ITALY ALITALIA 1994 0,036 3876615 329,018 0,644 0,978 0,646 0,229
ITALY AIR DOLOMITI 1994 -0,562 66896,844 108,548 0,841 0,815 0,815 0,15
ITALY MERIDIANA 1994 0,072 201577,474 243,288 0,661 0,947 0,929 0,196
NETHERLANDS KLM 1994 0,081 9027656,052 440,127 0,637 1 0,533 0,321
PORTUGAL PORTUGALIA 1994 -0,038 43319 244,706 0,731 0,84 0,831 0,437
PORTUGAL TAP AIR PORTUGAL 1994 -0,188 1263158,736 170,319 0,407 0,974 0,759 0,46
SCANDINAVIA SAS 1994 0,029 4167355,248 199,755 0,5 0,998 0,769 0,293
SPAIN AVIACO 1994 -0,021 425349,232 263,407 0,643 0,997 0,961 0,257
SPAIN IBERIA 1994 0,017 3610211,92 181,295 0,624 1 0,768 0,23
SPAIN BINTER CANARIAS 1994 -0,132 71660,499 124,279 0,775 1 0,942 0,252
SPAIN VIVA AIR 1994 0,025 162238,529 372,779 0,692 0,951 0,925 0,327
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH AIRWAYS 1994 0,106 14126691,56 334,044 0,487 0,998 0,721 0,178
UNTD KINGDOM AIR UK 1994 0,02 217901,793 127,401 0,69 0,95 0,936 0,084
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH MIDLAND 1994 0,015 182343,519 131,294 0,657 0,616 0,59 0,125
UNTD KINGDOM GB AIRWAYS 1994 0,031 20318,666 522,929 0,7 0,543 0,509 0,331
UNTD KINGDOM CATHAY PACIFIC 1994 0,098 7325149,613 566,39 0,659 1 0,561 0,149
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UNTD KINGDOM VIRGIN ATLANTIC 1994 -0,025 340940,167 795,792 0,586 1 0,725 0,274
AUSTRIA AUA 1995 -0,021 1651050,056 232,377 0,593 1 0,754 0,281
GERMANY LUFTHANSA 1995 0,025 12958995,66 499,479 0,625 1 0,501 0,393
ITALY MERIDIANA 1995 0,069 179210,319 263,698 0,637 0,936 0,92 0,265
FINLAND FINNAIR 1995 0,105 1530563,083 267,079 0,691 0,851 0,654 0,453
FRANCE AIR FRANCE 1995 0,031 11313662,75 373,349 0,675 0,998 0,536 0,252
FRANCE AIR FRANCE EUROPE 1995 -0,062 1739685,277 145,458 0,722 1 0,963 0,382
FRANCE AOM-MINERVE S.A. 1995 0,001 179848,109 805,842 0,857 0,911 0,766 0,233
GREECE OLYMPIC 1995 0,058 1001940,185 182,767 0,652 0,988 0,84 0,719
ITALY ALITALIA 1995 0,038 3977451 361,119 0,647 0,99 0,649 0,214
NETHERLANDS KLM 1995 0,049 10036379,89 441,548 0,637 1 0,535 0,314
PORTUGAL TAP AIR PORTUGAL 1995 -0,081 1481816,622 199,327 0,434 0,924 0,712 0,666
SCANDINAVIA SAS 1995 0,077 4295299,272 203,035 0,555 0,99 0,761 0,365
SPAIN AVIACO 1995 -0,004 474355,574 272,653 0,64 0,986 0,953 0,252
SPAIN BINTER CANARIAS 1995 -0,008 78992,609 214,199 0,779 1 0,942 0,186
SPAIN IBERIA 1995 0,07 3836401,47 198,613 0,621 1 0,752 0,125
SWITZERLAND SWISSAIR 1995 0,012 6660791,98 287,377 0,63 0,992 0,549 0,33
UNTD KINGDOM MAERSK AIR 1995 0,063 27562,066 43,397 0,604 0,992 0,956 0,547
UNTD KINGDOM AIR UK 1995 0,028 251102,94 141,294 0,686 0,974 0,959 0,072
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH AIRWAYS 1995 0,117 15700044,81 342,618 0,5 0,998 0,741 0,173
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH MIDLAND 1995 0,013 216243,311 142,402 0,657 0,649 0,62 0,109
UNTD KINGDOM CATHAY PACIFIC 1995 0,155 8573186,4 606,732 0,652 1 0,542 0,153
UNTD KINGDOM GB AIRWAYS 1995 0,038 16583,822 461,968 0,666 0,746 0,71 0,289
UNTD KINGDOM JERSEY EUR. AIRWAYS 1995 -0,066 28107,723 112,624 0,521 1 0,998 0,056
UNTD KINGDOM MANX AIRLINES EUROPE 1995 0,006 14060,309 139,829 0,661 0,78 0,777 0,164
UNTD KINGDOM VIRGIN ATLANTIC 1995 0,065 456137,6 847,687 0,616 1 0,712 0,275
GREECE OLYMPIC 1996 0,002 957712,327 209,976 0,677 0,988 0,849 0,641
FINLAND FINNAIR 1996 0,052 1367063,63 257,165 0,716 0,84 0,624 0,499
FRANCE AIR FRANCE 1996 0,033 10991397,42 388,177 0,7 1 0,554 0,201
GERMANY LUFTHANSA 1996 0,026 12392473,6 526,194 0,635 0,996 0,504 0,439
ITALY MERIDIANA 1996 0,022 166961,74 255,873 0,659 0,958 0,941 0,346
NETHERLANDS KLM 1996 0,008 9054541,367 455,887 0,667 1 0,549 0,258
SCANDINAVIA SAS 1996 0,047 5006629,255 216,543 0,563 0,989 0,726 0,403
SPAIN AVIACO 1996 0,001 532890,036 300,758 0,649 0,95 0,918 0,246
SPAIN IBERIA 1996 0,088 3664706,472 228,664 0,652 1 0,753 0,434
SWITZERLAND SWISSAIR 1996 0,009 6924686,019 336,022 0,665 0,959 0,549 0,311
UNTD KINGDOM CATHAY PACIFIC 1996 0,133 10643482,08 639,948 0,653 0,991 0,535 0,265
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH AIRWAYS 1996 0,102 16601347,62 354,337 0,521 0,998 0,734 0,2
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH MIDLAND 1996 0,017 301398,095 134,075 0,629 0,693 0,664 0,076
FINLAND FINNAIR 1997 0,084 1273624,418 264,601 0,692 0,847 0,621 0,595
GERMANY LUFTHANSA 1997 0,062 12278453,17 755,564 0,631 0,996 0,529 0,433
ITALY MERIDIANA 1997 0,044 160060,384 266,656 0,664 0,972 0,955 0,381
ITALY AIR DOLOMITI 1997 0,058 43796,079 123,996 0,694 0,972 0,972 0,278
NETHERLANDS KLM 1997 0,057 8822614,626 466,787 0,658 1 0,586 0,278
NORWAY COAST AIR K/S 1997 0,014 2939,541 44,044 0,952 0,979 0,979 0,39
NORWAY WIDEROE 1997 0,039 190351,368 58,488 0,55 0,993 0,983 0,197
SCANDINAVIA SAS 1997 0,053 4599902,314 227,253 0,566 0,987 0,702 0,414
SPAIN AIR NOSTRUM 1997 0,038 41721,046 106,733 0,756 0,985 0,985 0,029
SPAIN AVIACO 1997 0,056 458422 310,844 0,669 0,893 0,864 0,271
SPAIN BINTER CANARIAS 1997 0,037 58996,705 366,476 0,772 0,995 0,906 0,186
SPAIN BINTER MEDIT. 1997 -0,249 24380,489 117,983 0,781 1 0,982 0,098
SPAIN PANAIR 1997 -0,007 16341,037 250,124 0,862 0,76 0,76 0,267
SPAIN IBERIA 1997 0,082 3152983,2 245,031 0,657 0,998 0,766 0,458
SWEDEN MALMO AVIATION AB 1997 0,037 37642,46 124,563 0,628 1 1 0,358
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH AIRWAYS 1997 0,068 18616101,91 392,736 0,491 0,995 0,726 0,181
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH MIDLAND 1997 0,027 372352,388 125,629 0,607 0,709 0,68 0,066
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH REGIONAL 1997 0,029 63783,708 184,277 0,659 0,848 0,837 0,152
UNTD KINGDOM CITYFLYER EXPRESS 1997 0,062 60207,562 147,375 0,647 0,971 0,971 0,074
UNTD KINGDOM GB AIRWAYS 1997 0,132 104785,803 436,089 0,575 1 0,953 0,097
UNTD KINGDOM JERSEY EUR. AIRWAYS 1997 0,033 107006,56 197,857 0,627 0,996 0,976 0,272
UNTD KINGDOM VIRGIN ATLANTIC 1997 0,082 1092529,883 681,833 0,626 1 0,712 0,186
FINLAND FINNAIR 1998 0,05 1688406,605 267,266 0,687 0,849 0,654 0,595
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GERMANY LUFTHANSA 1998 0,101 13657322,45 774,826 0,632 0,996 0,54 0,296
IRELAND RYANAIR 1998 0,229 421645,667 201,388 0,695 1 1 0,628
ITALY MERIDIANA 1998 0,052 222198,336 276,775 0,675 0,992 0,978 0,264
ITALY MINERVA AIRLINES 1998 -0,02 18094,457 286,178 0,783 1 1 0,108
SCANDINAVIA SAS 1998 0,04 4728696,353 211,568 0,57 0,987 0,709 0,42
SPAIN AIR EUROPA 1998 0,016 191486,594 576,089 0,906 0,381 0,381 0,175
SPAIN AIR NOSTRUM 1998 0,064 59814,13 131,894 0,755 0,993 0,993 0,024
SPAIN IBERIA 1998 0,08 3559488,09 260,373 0,559 1 0,792 0,367
SPAIN SPANAIR S.A. 1998 0,016 149214,564 484,142 0,654 0,403 0,403 0,166
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH AIRWAYS 1998 0,063 21461102,1 410,716 0,545 0,993 0,731 0,158
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH MED. AIRWAYS 1998 0,037 15318,482 548,387 0,707 1 0,985 0,592
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH MIDLAND 1998 0,019 484885,18 110,572 0,624 0,819 0,784 0,05
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH REGIONAL 1998 0,029 134705,534 197,129 0,653 0,89 0,884 0,183
UNTD KINGDOM BRYMON AIRWAYS 1998 0,083 54074,257 111,77 0,627 0,928 0,926 0,179
UNTD KINGDOM CITYFLYER EXPRESS 1998 0,055 74623,762 159,376 0,659 0,949 0,947 0,113
UNTD KINGDOM DEBONAIR AIRWAYS LTD 1998 -0,275 34095,709 351,043 0,746 0,763 0,763 0,363
UNTD KINGDOM EASYJET AIRLINE 1998 0,02 45490,817 335,566 0,694 1 1 0,616
UNTD KINGDOM GB AIRWAYS 1998 0,198 136773,926 495,68 0,647 1 0,962 0,09
UNTD KINGDOM JERSEY EUROPEAN 1998 0,046 110762,375 182,343 0,654 0,972 0,955 0,201
UNTD KINGDOM KLM UK 1998 -0,005 428737,619 149,62 0,67 0,983 0,973 0,055
UNTD KINGDOM MAERSK AIR 1998 0,017 123604,623 263,127 0,637 0,847 0,818 0,338
UNTD KINGDOM VIRGIN ATLANTIC 1998 0,108 1353765,191 771,693 0,626 1 0,74 0,154
FINLAND FINNAIR 1999 0,033 1361569,367 272,678 0,682 0,679 0,485 0,503
NETHERLANDS KLM 1999 0,003 8224316,614 458,377 0,698 1 0,585 0,208
SCANDINAVIA SAS 1999 0,007 4824787,786 205,694 0,566 0,984 0,721 0,429
SPAIN AIR NOSTRUM 1999 0,071 188595,052 124,287 0,737 0,992 0,992 0,006
SPAIN BINTER MEDIT. 1999 0,029 16254,768 120,162 0,786 1 0,988 0,046
SPAIN IBERIA 1999 0,009 4275759,872 259,3 0,572 1 0,792 0,289
SPAIN SPANAIR S.A. 1999 0,019 287623,258 435,966 0,58 0,538 0,49 0,08
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH AIRWAYS 1999 0,013 22279485,9 420,044 0,57 0,996 0,722 0,18
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH MED. AIRWAYS 1999 -0,018 11786,525 517,794 0,72 1 0,986 0,626
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH MIDLAND 1999 0,015 571651,432 117,438 0,671 0,71 0,682 0,043
UNTD KINGDOM BRITISH REGIONAL 1999 0,041 191035,457 192,178 0,656 0,893 0,888 0,121
UNTD KINGDOM BRYMON AIRWAYS 1999 0,085 64749,878 105,549 0,694 0,927 0,926 0,648
UNTD KINGDOM CITYFLYER EXPRESS 1999 0,046 86477,645 178,159 0,667 0,922 0,92 0,101
UNTD KINGDOM GB AIRWAYS 1999 0,111 101178,457 452,011 0,705 1 0,966 0,057
UNTD KINGDOM GILL AVIATION 1999 0,011 70286,422 160,231 0,752 1 1 0,096
UNTD KINGDOM GO FLY LTD 1999 -0,206 80474,41 550,744 0,633 0,992 0,992 0,614
UNTD KINGDOM JERSEY EUR. AIRWAYS 1999 0,014 128531,023 215,554 0,637 0,893 0,878 0,014
UNTD KINGDOM KLM UK 1999 -0,047 370997,379 167,724 0,717 0,982 0,973 0,162
UNTD KINGDOM MAERSK AIR 1999 0,04 145164,279 263,864 0,616 0,798 0,775 0,281
UNTD KINGDOM VIRGIN ATLANTIC 1999 0,042 1514859,465 821,198 0,681 1 0,737 0,216
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 IV
Appendix 2 
 
Data for US airlines 
 
 
Below we present the data and variables for the US airlines we used for the 
regression. They are presented by years. 
State Name Year  
Profit 
Margin Size 
Labor 
Prod. 
Cap. 
Cost 
Share of 
Scheduled
Share of 
Passenger Solidity 
US AMERICAN 1993 0,038 17749121 349,367 0,644 1 0,838 0,56 
US USAIR 1993 -0,019 6809430 245,932 0,668 0,992 0,917 0,406 
US AMERICAN TRANSAIR 1993 0,012 269830 421,532 0,715 0,287 0,287 0,329 
US AMERICA WEST 1993 0,091 1035730 300,951 0,649 0,997 0,927 0,282 
US ALASKA 1993 -0,032 1037546 269,467 0,693 0,987 0,864 0,297 
US CONTINENTAL 1993 -0,009 5099827 330,377 0,627 0,994 0,861 0,354 
US DELTA 1993 -0,022 11641149 385,83 0,636 0,999 0,863 0,354 
US TOWER AIR 1993 0,072 191644 1375,22 0,692 0,596 0,472 0,435 
US HAWAIIAN AIRLINES 1993 -0,034 105386 391,874 0,712 0,995 0,908 0,212 
US NORTHWEST 1993 0,039 8554136 487,399 0,604 0,991 0,72 0,331 
US TWA 1993 -0,08 2915479 263,755 0,617 0,995 0,838 0,134 
US UNITED 1993 0,021 12153325 399,787 0,58 0,998 0,832 0,276 
US ALASKA 1994 0,058 1244985 362,594 0,676 0,988 0,903 0,346 
US AMERICA WEST 1994 0,103 1545092 306,041 0,641 0,997 0,922 0,541 
US AMERICAN 1994 0,061 17815170 385,413 0,615 0,999 0,83 0,508 
US AMERICAN TRANSAIR 1994 0,015 346287 449,092 0,707 0,39 0,39 0,406 
US BUSINESS EXPRESS 1994 -0,041 52173 116,318 0,793 1 1 0,364 
US CARNIVAL AIRLINES 1994 0,019 45836 472,086 0,711 0,813 0,774 0,387 
US CONTINENTAL 1994 -0,018 4276603 313,572 0,657 0,987 0,86 0,405 
US DELTA 1994 -0,017 11343318 395,632 0,628 0,999 0,853 0,34 
US HAWAIIAN AIRLINES 1994 -0,037 163261 359,305 0,713 0,999 0,889 0,45 
US HORIZON AIR 1994 0,05 153646 82,105 0,725 1 0,967 0,658 
US NORTHWEST 1994 0,098 9401951 474,123 0,589 0,992 0,708 0,353 
US TOWER AIR 1994 0,013 177877 856,514 0,681 0,753 0,553 0,508 
US TWA 1994 -0,071 2507013 322,016 0,597 0,995 0,831 0,118 
US UNITED 1994 0,037 11951620 436,228 0,619 0,998 0,837 0,211 
US USAIR 1994 -0,077 6675960 270,277 0,673 0,989 0,923 0,372 
US ALASKA 1995 0,062 1262125 344,607 0,681 0,993 0,914 0,357 
US AMERICA WEST 1995 0,099 1588709 348,593 0,642 0,997 0,928 0,581 
US AMERICAN 1995 0,062 18013971 417,668 0,616 0,999 0,831 0,45 
US AMERICAN TRANSAIR 1995 0,022 413137 433,583 0,731 0,506 0,506 0,411 
US BUSINESS EXPRESS 1995 -0,054 42270 96,74 0,808 1 1 0,342 
US CARNIVAL AIRLINES 1995 0,03 58555 525,855 0,684 0,879 0,769 0,482 
US CONTINENTAL 1995 0,048 4188766 330,401 0,652 0,993 0,879 0,348 
US DELTA 1995 0,083 11942992 397,433 0,637 1 0,857 0,337 
US HAWAIIAN AIRLINES 1995 -0,006 161640 471,236 0,705 0,898 0,782 0,401 
US HORIZON AIR 1995 0,015 154925 91,512 0,752 1 0,967 0,629 
US MID-WEST EXPRESS 1995 0,131 88543 246,478 0,612 0,986 0,86 0,463 
US NORTHWEST 1995 0,102 10695873 453,786 0,653 0,998 0,734 0,468 
US RENO AIR INC 1995 0,033 99484 582,764 0,719 0,916 0,902 0,21 
US TOWER AIR 1995 0,028 210547 782,564 0,607 0,711 0,669 0,471 
US TWA 1995 0,011 2860007 343,087 0,649 0,994 0,845 0,215 
US UNITED 1995 0,056 11392938 437,015 0,623 0,998 0,83 0,255 
US USAIR 1995 0,034 6823527 276,926 0,655 0,989 0,924 0,377 
US ALASKA 1996 0,062 1247900 328,06 0,682 0,995 0,925 0,422 
US AMERICA WEST 1996 0,039 1597676 370,078 0,654 0,997 0,933 0,572 
US AMERICAN 1996 0,088 18104371 436,252 0,643 0,999 0,835 0,42 
US CONTINENTAL 1996 0,072 4419078 286,547 0,636 0,994 0,877 0,376 
US DELTA 1996 0,043 11975293 458,752 0,653 1 0,869 0,303 
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US NORTHWEST 1996 0,114 11318419 453,2 0,672 0,999 0,755 0,499
US TWA 1996 -0,056 2690194 340,602 0,632 0,995 0,855 0,285
US UNITED 1996 0,069 12901588 397,293 0,63 0,999 0,829 0,292
US USAIR 1996 0,048 7409773 288,552 0,635 0,993 0,925 0,288
US ALASKA 1997 0,091 1370734 358,16 0,679 0,997 0,929 0,418
US AMERICA WEST 1997 0,086 1547331 376,595 0,688 0,998 0,931 0,569
US AMERICAN 1997 0,091 17765116 423,76 0,652 0,999 0,839 0,481
US AMERICAN TRANSAIR 1997 0,013 466923 363,776 0,726 0,504 0,504 0,226
US CONTINENTAL 1997 0,101 5410945 343,739 0,652 0,996 0,872 0,382
US CONTINENTAL EXPRESS 1997 0,15 274772 169,304 0,8 1 0,995 0,171
US CONTINENTAL MICRON. 1997 0,002 687423 796,816 0,598 0,986 0,76 0,818
US DELTA 1997 0,114 13113756 439,527 0,638 0,999 0,856 0,402
US EXECUTIVE AIRLINES 1997 0,093 57809 52,979 0,642 1 0,999 0,002
US HAWAIIAN AIRLINES 1997 0,005 200824 496,04 0,72 0,858 0,724 0,561
US HORIZON AIR 1997 0,017 158014 102,083 0,758 1 0,963 0,602
US MID-WEST EXPRESS 1997 0,123 169078 227,155 0,628 0,99 0,882 0,49
US MIDWAY AIRLINES 1997 0,081 142112 343,237 0,679 1 0,988 0,489
US NORTHWEST 1997 0,121 12409779 475,064 0,671 0,998 0,758 0,511
US RENO AIR INC 1997 -0,026 193409 569,73 0,738 0,915 0,898 0,433
US TOWER AIR 1997 0,016 310120 871,469 0,658 0,769 0,628 0,266
US TWA 1997 -0,009 2776902 325,728 0,672 0,998 0,877 0,297
US UNITED 1997 0,071 16106959 437,015 0,632 0,999 0,809 0,305
US USAIR 1997 0,069 8265500 288,222 0,622 0,996 0,92 0,384
US ALASKA 1998 0,123 1548843 368,696 0,677 0,998 0,935 0,448
US AMERICA WEST 1998 0,1 1594644 358,492 0,656 0,999 0,941 0,598
US AMERICAN 1998 0,107 19240780 417,774 0,643 1 0,845 0,489
US AMERICAN EAGLE AIRL. 1998 0,126 940073 77,684 0,723 0,999 0,996 0,277
US AMERICAN TRANSAIR 1998 0,091 581046 374,684 0,717 0,595 0,595 0,246
US CONTINENTAL 1998 0,09 6787212 352,559 0,633 0,999 0,869 0,353
US CONTINENTAL EXPRESS 1998 0,139 328313 156,499 0,772 1 0,997 0,212
US CONTINENTAL MICRON. 1998 -0,062 525961 614,905 0,532 0,99 0,756 0,662
US DELTA 1998 0,123 14605811 426,321 0,63 0,999 0,857 0,399
US HAWAIIAN AIRLINES 1998 0,041 221909 495,966 0,706 0,86 0,731 0,513
US HORIZON AIR 1998 0,051 187091 119,902 0,742 1 0,971 0,542
US MIDWAY AIRLINES 1998 0,124 203581 436,912 0,671 1 0,992 0,394
US MID-WEST EXPRESS 1998 0,15 221414 223,687 0,627 0,995 0,897 0,463
US NORTHWEST 1998 -0,015 13921100 429,987 0,67 0,999 0,773 0,389
US RENO AIR INC 1998 0,005 164580 623,331 0,704 0,893 0,875 0,342
US TOWER AIR 1998 0,035 350762 760,692 0,595 0,845 0,817 0,231
US TWA 1998 -0,02 2559236 332,438 0,662 0,998 0,9 0,319
US UNITED 1998 0,082 18829532 437,359 0,633 1 0,807 0,316
US USAIR 1998 0,116 8796388 293,72 0,595 0,997 0,923 0,414
US ALASKA 1999 0,104 1981177 355,967 0,689 0,999 0,941 0,31
US AMERICA WEST 1999 0,091 1663495 422,033 0,678 0,999 0,949 0,59
US AMERICAN 1999 0,062 21767277 396,331 0,638 0,999 0,841 0,474
US AMERICAN EAGLE AIRL. 1999 0,052 1375515 90,113 0,726 0,999 0,996 0,213
US AMERICAN TRANSAIR 1999 0,086 823090 329,722 0,727 0,669 0,669 0,194
US CONTINENTAL 1999 0,06 8413947 365,978 0,646 0,999 0,862 0,308
US CONTINENTAL EXPRESS 1999 0,163 359145 184,637 0,804 1 0,998 0,347
US CONTINENTAL MICRON. 1999 0,06 461856 674,613 0,588 0,995 0,756 0,754
US DELTA 1999 0,085 19699494 423,41 0,65 0,999 0,856 0,323
US HAWAIIAN AIRLINES 1999 -0,083 251700 477,981 0,731 0,854 0,732 0,524
US HORIZON AIR 1999 0,061 212972 123,076 0,732 1 0,975 0,519
US MESABA AVIATION 1999 0,119 203483 161,103 0,94 1 0,999 0,603
US MID-WEST EXPRESS 1999 0,145 264207 236,763 0,641 0,996 0,913 0,491
US NORTHWEST 1999 0,078 13854186 455,211 0,678 0,999 0,76 0,439
US TWA 1999 -0,104 2140447 361,467 0,654 0,998 0,908 0,315
US UNITED 1999 0,076 21542952 427,591 0,634 0,999 0,803 0,368
US US AIR 1999 0,024 9507609 294,287 0,598 0,998 0,925 0,375
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Appendix 3 
 
Residual plots for EU airlines 
 
These residual plots are produced in the context of heteroskedasticity. To 
avoid such a statistical error-term, the residuals should be randomly 
distributed around zero. Unusual patterns in the residuals would most likely 
cause an incorrect R2 in the regression. As can be observed from the plots 
below, no pattern is visible and the possibility of heteroskedasticity can be 
rejected among the variables for EU airlines. 
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Partial Regression Plot
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Appendix 4 
 
Residual Plots for the US airline data 
 
These residual plots are produced in the context of heteroskedasticity. To 
avoid such a statistical error-term, the residuals should be randomly 
distributed around zero. Unusual patterns in the residuals would most likely 
cause an incorrect R2 in the regression. As can be observed from the plots 
below, no pattern are visible and the possibility of heteroskedasticity can be 
rejected among the variables for US airlines. 
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Partial Regression Plot
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